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ABSTRACT
The Forgotten Footnote of the Second World War: An Examination of the Historiography of
Scandinavia during World War II
by
Jason Phillips
The Anglo-American interpretation of the Second World War has continuously overlooked the
significance of the Scandinavian region to the outcome of the war. This thesis seeks to address
some of the more glaring errors of omission that have dampened the Anglo-American
understanding of the war. Attention will first be paid to Finland and how its war against the
Soviet Union in 1939-1940, known as the Winter War, influenced Adolf Hitler and his decision
to launch Operation ‘Barbarossa.’ In regards to Sweden, attention will be paid to how critical
Swedish iron ore was to the Nazi war economy. Finally, the thesis will examine how the AngloAmerican interpretation of the German invasion of Norway is flawed. The thesis seeks to
change the way that the role Scandinavia played during the Second World War is understood
amongst Anglo-American historians and begin a new conversation on the story of World War II.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
More books have been written about the Second World War than could ever be read in a
lifetime, with hundreds of new volumes added every year. Everything from military to economic
histories of the war, biographies of participants from Adolf Hitler to Field Marshal Montgomery,
general surveys to critical examinations of battles, armies, or the means of production of various
belligerents have garnered their own books and articles. Yet, for all that has been written about
the Second World War, one key area of the war has continued to be under covered amongst
Anglo-American historians: Scandinavia. The general interpretation of how the war affected this
geographic area is brief and vague, only rarely do English-speaking historians delve into this
region in their works on the Second World War. This thesis seeks to address this critical
oversight and show why Scandinavia was more important to the outcome of the Second World
War than Anglo-American historians have generally acknowledged it to have been.
In order to illustrate the general interpretation of the role Scandinavia played during
World War II, five general surveys of the War will be analyzed to understand how Finland,
Sweden, and Norway have fit into the Anglo-American story of the War.1 Winston Churchill’s
six volume history, The Second World War, represents the first interpretation of the Second
World War, and its importance as a major work of World War II continues to this day. B.H.
Liddell Hart’s History of the Second World War, published in 1970, was a major work of the
second wave of World War II scholarship, and like Churchill’s work it is still held in high regard
amongst historians. Military historian John Keegan became a prominent historian with the
publication of his groundbreaking work, The Face of Battle; however, it is his 1989 work The

1

For the purpose of this study Scandinavia will be defined as Norway, Sweden, and Finland; rather than the
traditional definition of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.
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Second World War which is of interest to this thesis. In order to get a modern perspective, two
books from 2011, Max Hastings’s Inferno: The World At War, 1939-1945 and Andrew Roberts’s
The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War will be analyzed. These works were
chosen because they have either had a long publishing history and history of academic use or
they have been recent revisions by prominent military historians, making them a genuine
example of the Anglo-American historiographic tradition. These authors’ views of Finland,
Sweden, and Norway will be discussed in detail.
War for Finland did not begin in September 1939; rather, it had essentially been going on
since 1938 when the Soviet Union began discussions with the Finns for bases in the Gulf of
Finland that could be used to protect the Soviet city of Leningrad. The Finns refused to
capitulate to the Soviet demands, even after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which
made allies of Germany and the Soviet Union and ended Finnish hopes for an alliance with
Adolf Hitler for the maintenance of Finnish sovereignty. War would breakout between Finland
and the Soviet Union on the last day of November 1939 and last until March 1940. After the
defeat of Finland, the Finnish government began to drift as close to Germany as they could and
joined in Operation ‘Barbarossa,’ or in Finland what was called the Continuation War against the
Soviet Union. The wars themselves will be covered in more detail in the first chapter of this
thesis. The Finns were also a main supplier of raw materials to Hitler’s Reich, especially Finnish
nickel.
It would be unfair to criticize Churchill for not giving events in Scandinavia during the
winter of 1939-1940 enough coverage, for he spends a great deal of time in analyzing these
events, specifically the Winter War and how it could be used to the benefit of the British war
strategy. However, this is all that Churchill actually discusses in any detail. There is no mention
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of the nickel trade or how it had influenced German-Soviet relations, nor is there any serious
discussion of how the Germans viewed the Winter War. Churchill noted, “There is no doubt that
Hitler and all his generals meditated profoundly upon the Finnish exposure, and that it played a
potent part in influencing the Fuehrer’s thought.”2 This was certainly true, but Churchill’s
account lacked any discussion of the larger issue of Finnish-Soviet relations and how this
affected Hitler’s thinking.
Liddell Hart had been a British Captain during the First World War and later became a
highly influential writer of military theory and history in Great Britain. Liddell Hart’s
interpretation of the Winter War was much better than Churchill’s, although he draws the same
conclusion. The reason that Liddell Hart’s interpretation is better is that he covered the war in a
small chapter, keeping everything together and providing a more detailed analysis of the conflict;
whereas, Churchill had parts about the Winter War scattered throughout his six volume set.
Liddell Hart argued that the British saw in Finland an opportunity to capture the Swedish iron
ore and that the war showed the world the deficiencies of the Red Army, something that would
influence Hitler’s decision to launch Operation Barbarossa.3 The problem with Liddell Hart’s
work, though, is that he did not discuss the impact that the Winter War had on German thinking
in more than just one sentence. Liddell Hart simply stated his claims and sweept through the
Winter War in a matter of pages, leaving little covered of actual importance.
Military historian John Keegan has been regarded as a genius on military theory. His
1989 book, The Second World War, has generally been regarded as an authority of World War II.
There is one problem with Keegan’s book, though; he only devoted three paragraphs to the
Winter War. Keegan did point out that the Winter War allowed the Germans to understand that
2

Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 543.
B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Konecky & Konecky,
1970), 44-45.
3
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the Allies had plans on occupying Scandinavia and cutting off the iron-ore shipments the
Germans needed, but he did this in a few sentences and moves on.4 Keegan did not give much
analysis on why the Winter War mattered to World War II or how it influenced Hitler’s decision
to invade the Soviet Union. Instead, Keegan simply described the War in a few paragraphs in
military terms and moved on; in this, he seriously understated the impact that this limited conflict
would have upon the later direction of the war.
Max Hastings did a much better job of describing the conflict in detail than the other
authors mentioned before, as he devoted more pages and more time in discussing the conflict,
how the Winter War was waged, and the key campaigns and battles of the Winter War.
Hastings’s interpretation is not a fully accurate interpretation of the Winter War and its
significance, though. For instance, Hastings argued, “The Finnish campaign was irrelevant to
the confrontation between Germany and the Allies, but it importantly influenced the strategy of
both. They alike concluded that the Soviet Union was a paper tiger; that Stalin’s armies were
weak, his commanders bunglers.”5 Certainly this is an important point and an accurate
conclusion of the significance of the Winter War, but it does not tell the full story. Hastings did
not expand much upon this one single point, leaving a lot of the importance of the Winter War
out of his book.
Andrew Roberts’s interpretation, though succinct, contained a great military analysis of
the Winter War but offered little more. For instance, Roberts noted that Hitler had learned the
lesson from the Winter War that the Soviet Union was weak and could be conquered.6 Yet
nowhere in Roberts’s interpretation of the Second World War is found any mention of Finnish

4

John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 49.
Max Hastings, Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 2011), 38-39.
6
Andrew Roberts, The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, 2011), 29-34.
5
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nickel or the impact of Finnish-Soviet relations on Nazi thinking. So while Roberts might have
written a New History of the Second World War, some of the interpretations remain from the old
interpretations of Churchill, Liddell Hart, and Keegan. One thing that is astounding about
Roberts’s work, and Hastings’s work as well, is that they could continue to point to the Winter
War as influencing Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union yet never analyze if there was
more to the story of Finland or how this small state influenced Hitler. The first chapter of this
work will show that there is more to the story than these historians have noted.
Unlike Finland, Sweden was never invaded nor did Sweden ever take up arms against
either the Allied or the Axis Powers. How, then, could this nation have made a major impact
upon how the Second World War played our? The answer is simple, Sweden possessed the
finest iron ore on the planet and Germany was a major trading partner of the Swedes. Indeed,
Swedish iron ore would drive Allied plans during the Winter War and play a determining role in
Hitler’s decision to invade Norway in April 1940. Swedish iron ore was absolutely critical to the
German war economy, for without it the Germans could not have fought the Second World War.
Amazingly, though, this is something that is also severely under covered amongst AngloAmerican historians. The Swedish participation in rescuing Holocaust victims has also been
largely ignored by English-speaking historians, even though it is the greatest evidence of the
importance of Swedish iron ore to the German war economy. The Germans were so concerned
over losing the iron ore that they overlooked the Swedes rescuing Jews; no other country
received this free pass from Hitler and the Nazis.
As he did with the Winter War, Churchill spent a lot of time covering the importance of
Swedish iron ore to British strategy, specifically how the British could withhold it from
Germany. Indeed, compared to the later works, Churchill’s account is by far the most thorough.
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Yet, Churchill never goes back to the importance of Swedish iron ore after the occupation of
Norway. For Churchill, once it could no longer be taken away from the Germans, it lost all
importance. Liddell Hart briefly introduced the concept of Swedish iron ore into his discussion
of early Allied plans to use the Winter War in order to prevent Germany from attaining any more
iron ore from Sweden but never went into any detail of why this would have helped the British
win the war or the impact that this would have on the Second World War. Keegan only
mentioned Swedish iron ore in his discussion of Allied intentions for Scandinavia and cutting
Germany off of this vital resource. Hastings mentioned Swedish iron ore twice in his latest work
and Roberts only brings it up three times; both historians brought the issue up only when talking
about Allied strategy to cut the iron ore off. The story of the importance of Swedish iron ore for
later German actions, especially in Russia, then, has continued to lose out in the newer AngloAmerican works on the Second World War, with fewer and fewer pages devoted to this topic.
None of these works mentions any of the actions by the Swedish government or its citizenry to
rescue the Jews during the Holocaust, it is just not important to the general story that AngloAmerican historians have construed.
As stated earlier, the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union brought
Scandinavia into the spotlight, with the Allies looking for ways to cut off the German supply of
Swedish iron ore. The major view of how to do that was to occupy the Norwegian port of
Narvik, which was from where the Swedish iron ore was shipped during the winter months when
Swedish ports were too frozen to receive ships. This strategy, combined with the Altmark
Incident, which was a naval engagement between British and German ships in Norwegian
waters, would lead to the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. The Anglo-American
interpretation of the invasion, though, often seems based more on myth than fact, for the Anglo-

9

American interpretation places the blame on the actions of Vidkun Quisling. Quisling was a farright politician in Norway before the war who wanted to institute a coup with Nazi support.
Because of his visits with Hitler, though, he has become the scapegoat for the German decision
to invade Norway, an interpretation that conveniently overlooks British sins of omission.
Churchill’s interpretation of the reason the invasion was launched had little to do with the
Altmark Incident, although Churchill did concede that the event “no doubt gave a spur to
action.”7 Churchill placed the blame upon Quisling and refused to budge from this, inserting a
massive quote from the Nuremburg trials in which German General Falkenhorst described how
he was selected to lead the German invasion of Norway. Essentially, Falkenhorst stated that the
Germans drew plans up for an invasion because of fears that the British were about to take
preventative measures in Norway.8 The implication behind this is that the Germans were already
planning the occupation of this country, and the Altmark Incident was just a minor event that led
to Hitler launching the invasion a little early. Churchill made it a point, as the third chapter of
this thesis will show, to argue that the German decision was made upon Quisling’s December
visit to Germany in which Quisling stressed that the British were going to take action in Norway
to Hitler.
Liddell Hart’s interpretation of why the Germans chose to invade Norway is much more
reliable and does not make the same mistakes that Churchill’s interpretation made. For instance,
Liddell Hart correctly pointed out that Hitler’s reaction to the Quisling visit was that it was in
Germany’s interest for Norway to remain a neutral country, not that Quisling’s visit had
convinced Hitler of the need to invade Norway and institute a puppet government. Liddell Hart
argued, “According to the German admirals, the Altmark affair was decisive in swinging Hitler

7
8

Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 564.
Churchill, 564.
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in favour of intervention in Norway. It was the spark that set fire to the powder trail.”9 Keegan
would continue in his work the correct interpretation of events that Liddell Hart had argued.
Keegan noted that the Quisling visit had not resulted in a concrete German decision to invade
Norway, but rather it was the Altmark Incident that pushed Hitler to the decision that Norway
should be occupied before it was too late.10
Ironically, despite the more accurate interpretations of Liddell Hart and Keegan, both
Hastings’s and Roberts’s later accounts of the German decision to invade Norway are both
overly vague in their interpretation. Hastings mentioned the Altmark Incident but did not put any
significance onto it other than noting, “For months, Hitler had been fearful of British intervention
in Norway,…[Hitler’s] agitation acquired urgency on 14 February 1940, when Royal Navy
destroyers pursued…[the] Altmark into a Norwegian fjord to free 299 captive British merchant
seamen. Determined to preempt a British initiative…he gave the final order for the invasion
fleet to sail.”11 Curiously absent from Hastings work is any reference to the meetings between
Hitler and Quisling. Rather than continuing the flawed interpretation of Churchill, then,
Hastings can be criticized for refusing to even tackle the question of why Germany invaded
Norway. Roberts, on the other hand, fell into the Churchill trap by arguing, “An incident on 16
February, in which the neutral Norwegians seemed to have taken the Royal Navy’s side when
HMS Cossack daringly rescued 299 British prisoners from a German vessel, the Altmark, also
persuaded the Führer of Norway’s iniquity.”12 Roberts did not place any of the blame on
Quisling per se; rather, Roberts notes that Admiral Erich Raeder had recommended establishing

9

Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 55-56.
Keegan, The Second World War, 49-50.
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bases in Norway, which was something Raeder and Quisling had discussed.13 Essentially, then,
Roberts was arguing that it was not the Altmark Incident that urged Hitler to action, the decision
goes back to Hitler’s conversations with Raeder and Qusiling. As Chapter Three will show, the
decision to invade Norway was based solely upon the Altmark Incident, as everything
beforehand had been hypothetical planning.
What should be stressed about these various works and how they interpret Scandinavia
during World War II is the fact that none of the Anglo-American authors, with the exception of
Churchill, actually devote much space to the analysis of these countries. Churchill, of course,
wrote six-volumes on the war, so he had more of an opportunity to discuss this area than the
other authors. At the same time, it must be stressed how important it is that the only one of these
authors who spent a large amount of time covering Scandinavia during World War II, Churchill,
is ultimately flawed in his interpretation. This thesis will show that under covering Scandinavia
during the Second World War has been a mistake for several important reasons. The first
chapter will argue that Finland was extremely important to how the Germans viewed the Soviet
Union. The Winter War showed the Germans the weaknesses of the Soviet Union and Finnish
nickel helped push the Germans into launching Operation ‘Barbarossa.’ The second chapter will
examine how vital Swedish iron ore was to the German war economy and look into Swedish
actions during the Holocaust, particularly the rescue of the Danish Jews. The importance of
Swedish iron ore is illustrated by the fact that the Germans were willing to overlook the Swedes
saving Jews during the war because of the fact that they could not risk the Swedes blowing up
their mines and losing all of the iron ore that Sweden was providing them. The third chapter will
examine how the British can be blamed for both the invasion or Norway and the victory of the
Germans in Norway. This chapter will primarily focus upon why the Germans invaded Norway
13

Roberts, 38.
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and how the British squandered victory in Norway. These arguments will show why
Scandinavia is worthy of more than the mere footnote status that Anglo-American historians of
the Second World War have typically attached to it.
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CHAPTER 2
FINLAND: THE NATION THAT ALTERED THE COURSE OF THE WAR
Our navy was engaged against the Finnish fleet…I remember hearing when I was at
Stalin’s in Moscow that one of our submarines had been unable to sink a Swedish
merchant vessel which it had mistaken for a Finnish ship. The Germans observed this
incident and gave us a teasing pinch by offering their assistance: “Are things that bad?
You can’t even sink an unarmed ship? Maybe you need some help from us?” You can
imagine how painful this was to us. Hitler was letting us know that he recognized our
helplessness and was gloating over it.—Nikita Khrushchev14
Many historians have either forgotten the importance of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War
or have chosen to overlook its importance, but the pungent comment from Khrushchev’s
memoirs serves as a reminder of the significance contemporaries assigned the conflict. This
passage, so illustrative of German attitude towards the weakness they saw in the Red Army, is
also indicative of the impact that Finland had on Hitler’s decision for war with the Soviet Union,
and thus on the outcome of the Second World War. From the Winter War to the Continuation
War Finland never won any major battles nor did they even participate in any major battles;
however, Finland’s impact on the war should not be just a footnote in the annals of World War
II. In summary of the Winter War, Khrushchev wrote, “[The Winter War] also exposed our
weaknesses to Hitler. It doesn’t take much imagination to guess what Hitler must have
concluded…‘The Soviet Union has barely managed to handle a country that we could have
disposed of in a few hours. What would be left of the Russians if we attacked them with our best
equipment and masses of our best-trained, best-organized troops?”15
One of the most influential books written about Adolf Hitler’s decision to invade the
Soviet Union was Gabriel Gorodetsky’s Grand Delusion. The book has become a modern
classic and a highly influential work for any serious scholar of the Second World War. The main

14

Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1970), 153.
15
Ibid., 156.
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idea of Grand Delusion was that the German decision for the invasion of Russia was rooted not
solely in Nazi ideology but rather stemmed from the realities of the geopolitical scene at the
time. Gorodetsky argued,
Hitler’s decision to attack Russia is indeed enigmatic. It is hardly possible to detect a
direct line leading from his pledge in Mein Kampf to ‘terminate the endless German drive
to the south and west of Europe, and direct our gaze towards the lands in the east; to the
actual decision to embark on Operation ‘Barbarossa’. The commonly held view bypasses
the difficulty by claiming that Hitler had consistently aimed at the destruction of Moscow
‘as the headquarters of the “Judaeo-Bolshevist world conspiracy”’. The fact that the
crusade against Bolshevism and the extermination of the Jews revolutionized the course
of the war in 1941 is not sufficient in itself to prove steadfast adherence to a blueprint.
The ideological convictions found open expression only once the decision on
‘Barbarossa’ had been taken, and to a large extent diverted Hitler from a more rational
strategic policy which had characterized his military leadership so far.16
Although plausible, Gorodetsky’s analysis slighted one major geopolitical impediment to good
German-Soviet relations, Finland. While he went into great detail in describing how the Balkans
influenced Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union, Gorodetsky completely left Finland out
of the discussion. From Gorodetsky’s work one would get the impression that not only was
Finland not a major factor, but the country was not even a minor factor, in the events leading up
to ‘Operation Barbarossa.’ This failure to recognize the importance of Finland in both German
and Soviet calculations has consistently been a major trend in the historiography of ‘Operation
Barbarossa’ in particular and the Second World War in general.17
Historians and scholars have continued to overlook the influence that Finland had on
World War II. From the Winter War of 1939 between Finland and the Soviet Union to the end
of the Second World War in 1945, Finland played a crucial role in the diplomatic relationship
between Germany and the Soviet Union. Many works on the war have erroneously dismissed
the events that transpired in Finland preceding and during the German-Soviet war. Finland was
16

Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999), 48.
17
Ibid., 49-51.

15

instrumental not only in contributing to Hitler’s decision to go to war against the Soviet Union,
but was also one of the major suppliers of raw materials to the Germans during the war. Indeed,
without Finnish nickel the Germans could hardly have accomplished what they did militarily.
This chapter will examine both primary documents and secondary sources in order to determine
why Finland’s role in World War II has been relegated to a mere footnote in most histories of the
conflict.
In 1954 Albin Anderson argued that the origin of the Winter War could be explained in
the context of Germany’s attack upon Poland in September 1939. The Winter War was an
expression of the clash over Finland’s and Russia’s respective borders dating back to the 1920
Treaty of Dorpat that was signed following Finnish independence. The Soviets believed
Leningrad to be insecure and the Finns believed they had given up too much to the Soviet Union
in the Treaty of Dorpat.18 It was German actions, though, that provided the impetus for possible
border revisions. After the Austro-German Anschluss in March 1938, evidently emboldened by
Hitler’s success, Stalin initiated talks with Finland over the issue of their shared border. Then,
likely feeling menaced by the swift German victory over Poland, in a memorandum dated
October 14, 1939, Stalin made clear to Finland what the Soviets required for peace: “Securing
the safety of Leningrad” and “Becoming satisfied that Finland will have firm, friendly relations
with the Soviet Union.”19 Essentially, the talks that followed between the USSR and Finland
began and fell apart over the issue of Finland ceding the island of Hanko to the Soviets for use as
a naval base. This issue was important to both sides. A naval base at Hanko would have
allowed the Soviets to close the Gulf of Finland to an invading force and thus protect the city of
18

Albin T. Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy,” World Politics
6, no. 2 (January 1954): 169.
19
Soviet Proposals to Finland on Territorial Changes and Defence: Memorandum to the Finnish Minister
Paasikivi, October 14, 1939, League of Nations Official Journal, 1939, pg. 518. In Soviet Documents on Foreign
Policy vol. 3: 1933-1939 ed. Jane Degras (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 382.
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Leningrad, while to the Finns it was important because such a Russian base would only be ten
miles from the Finnish capital city of Helsinki, thus a serious threat to Finnish sovereignty. It
should be remembered that from 1807 until the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland had been ruled by
the Russians. The Russian rule was generally seen as oppressive, something that the Finnish
people had no desire to return to.20 Some historians, particularly John Lukacs, have argued that
Finland actually gained its independence from Russia in 1809 and it was not until 1900 that
Finland lost its freedom. This is based on the fact that the Finns were given political rights by
the Russians they had not enjoyed under the Swedes and were in fact the best treated minority in
any European empire in the nineteenth century.21 While it is true the Finns enjoyed a high
degree of freedom under the Russians at this time, they were still part of the Russian Empire, not
an autonomous country. Further, most Finns did not look back at the nineteenth century as a
period of freedom; rather, they saw it as further subjugation. As a result, most Finns saw the
Russians prior to the Winter War as an aggressive, oppressive neighbor. This sentiment was
readily apparent when Juho Kusti Paasikivi, an important Finnish politician who represented
Finland along with Väinӧ Tanner during the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, ultimately came to the
conclusion that it had been the Hanko issue that led to the collapse of negotiations and essentially
war.22
D.W. Spring argued in a 1986 article that the decision to invade Finland was not a light
one and that Stalin had been willing to acquiesce if the Finns would only work with him. Spring
argued that Hanko was not overly important, because on November 4, 1939, Stalin had returned
to the Soviet-Finnish discussions and shifted the Soviet demand from Hanko to other islands off

20
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the Hanko coast. In Spring’s opinion this was a clear indication that the decision for war had not
yet been made.23 Spring also argued that the creation of the Kuusinen government, a Moscow
puppet government positioned in Finland, did not represent a final break in relations as well.
However, as Timo Vihavainen has argued, Spring’s analysis is fundamentally flawed.
Vilhavainen argued that Spring, and historians who have argued similar points, have
misunderstood the seriousness of Soviet ideology. The Soviets were not using the Kussinen
government just as propaganda; rather, the Kuusinen government was a necessity for the Soviets
to achieve their territorial desires. Without Kuusinen the Soviets could not claim to be following
the people of Finland’s wish to be liberated from their capitalist government. The Kuusinen
government was the tool by which the Soviets justified conflict with Finland.24 Stalin saw the
Finns’ tenacity as a hindrance to Soviet security and the only solution was to use the Kuusinen
government as a tool to attain the security he felt they needed.
On the morning of November 30, 1939, the collapse of negotiations turned into war as
the Soviet Union invaded Finland. The invasion was based upon an earlier incident at Mainila
where it was claimed that Finnish troops had fired upon Soviet border guards; contemporary
research has proved this incident to be a false causus belli.25 For 105 days the two sides would
wage war upon one another, with neither side gaining a clear advantage. Olli Vehviläinen wrote
the best description of the immediate origin of the war in his book Finland in the Second World
War, “The Winter War of 1939-40 between Finland and the Soviet Union began with two
mistakes. The Finnish government believed that the Soviet Union would not attack, and Stalin
23

D.W. Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War Against Finland, 30 November, 1939” Soviet Studies 38, no.
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McAlester (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 45.
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believed that Finland would not be capable of offering any significant resistance.”26 The
beginning of the Winter War cannot be understood in any other context because neither side was
prepared for the war that followed. Marshal Mannerheim, head of Finland’s armed forces, had
even attempted to resign from his post because of the lack of preparation of Finland’s armed
forces leading up to November 1939. “I did not hide from the government that the immediate
future filled me with apprehension, and I could not conceal my surprise that government and
Parliament had shown themselves so disinclined to pass the appropriations I had
suggested…when we seemed to be on the threshold of war…I therefore felt compelled to declare
that I could no longer share the responsibility for neglected armaments.”27 Luckily for Finland,
Marshal Mannerheim would return to post once the Soviets crossed the border and Finnish forces
were able to halt the Soviet advance.
Despite their heroic, months-long resistance, the Finns were forced to surrender after the
Red Army, reorganized by General Timoshenko, was able to break through the Mannerheim
Line on February 11, 1940.28 This was the beginning of the end, as the Mannerheim Line was
the main Finnish protection from the Red Army.29 Once it was apparent that no immediate
military assistance would be provided by the Allies or Sweden, the Finnish government accepted
its fate and entered peace negotiations. The Treaty of Moscow ended the Winter War on March
12, 1940. The Treaty redrew the border between the Soviet Union and Finland with Finland
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losing the city of Viipuri as well as suffering the forced leasing of Hanko to the Soviet Union.30
This would not end hostilities, though, nor would the peace end the importance of Finland
towards the development of the Second World War. For as Waldemar Erfurth argued, “As a
serious consequence of the sudden outbreak of the Winter War and the lack of assistance from
other powers, the Finns were placed in a position of uncertainty. They felt deserted and believed
that their mighty eastern neighbor had further evil designs against their country, with the ultimate
object of destroying its independence.”31
Emphasis must be put on the Winter War and its significance in two important aspects.
The first is how the Winter War was viewed by the Allies as a way to cut off Axis iron ore
supplies from Sweden and the response in Germany to this idea. The second is how the Winter
War convinced Adolf Hitler that Nazi Germany could launch ‘Operation Barbarossa’ while
simultaneously waging war in the West. Hitler came to this conclusion because of both the poor
showing of the Red Army in Finland and the clash of German and Soviet interests in
Scandinavia. As Adam Ulam argued “for the Germans, the Finnish affair was…an
embarrassment and a temptation…It interfered with the supply of badly needed minerals from
Finland…[but] there was the lesson once again of Russia’s military weakness and the temptation
to press harder on her deeply compromised and isolated regime.”32 In these two aspects, the
importance of the Winter War has been severely understated by Anglo-American historians. By
analyzing secondary accounts of the Winter War and Finland’s role in World War II, along with
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primary accounts from Finnish, German, and even Allied leaders, a better understanding of those
105 days can be arrived at.
Winston Churchill’s The Second World War, was one of the few accounts of the Second
World War that placed a major emphasis upon the Winter War. Churchill argued, “I
sympathised ardently with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid; and I welcomed
this new and favourable breeze as a means of achieving the major strategic advantage of cutting
off vital iron-ore supplies of Germany.”33 This statement insinuated that the British were
planning to use the Winter War to cut off German supplies of iron-ore from Sweden, without
which the Third Reich could hardly have waged war. Therefore, the Winter War was far from a
miniscule event that did not affect the outcome of the Second World War. On the contrary, in
order to enervate Germany, the Allies nearly turned Scandinavia into a major theater of war. The
irony, of course, is that this statement also implies that the Allies would have gone to war with
the Soviet Union, which would have made military allies out of the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany. Essentially, the Allied search for any advantage against Hitler, which had led them to
Finland, would have actually gained them another powerful enemy, the Soviet Union. This
would have significantly altered the course of the war and twentieth century history. Facing two
powerful opponents would have markedly worsened the Allied situation, especially at a time of
limited French enthusiasm for war. Despite his insight into Finland’s importance, Churchill
ended his account of the Winter War episode in cavalier fashion, “On sixty days ‘Aid to Finland’
had been part of the Cabinet agenda. Nothing had come of it all. Finland had been crushed into
submission by Russia.”34 While Churchill’s analysis of the significance of cutting off Swedish
iron ore exports is accurate and shows the potential importance of the Winter War to the Allies,
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his lack of a detailed analysis of the war or its conclusion shows the ambivalence that Churchill
felt towards the Winter War, as well as his frustration with the inability of the War Cabinet to
take action or come to any decision at all. Churchill’s interpretation is also skewed by his Anglocentric approach; once the British could not send troops through Scandinavia into Finland the
Winter War lost its importance in the story of World War II, a mistake that Churchill would not
be the only historian to make.
The Allied interest in the Winter War did, of course, stem from the fact that they viewed
intervention in the conflict as a way of cutting off Swedish iron ore from Germany. The British
Ministry of Economic Warfare in November 1939 told the War Cabinet that without Swedish
iron ore, “Germany would be incapable of waging active war longer than twelve months.” This
effort to deprive Germany of vital raw materials became the primary focus of the Allies during
the Winter War.35 This strategy was heightened by the view that the Finnish war would
indirectly aggravate the supply of Soviet oil to Germany, as the Soviet Union would run out of
its surplus in its war with Finland. Combined with the loss of Swedish iron ore, the Allies
believed that the German war machine would be in serious trouble by April 1940.36 Andrew
Schwartz has argued that the Allied decision to aid the Finns was also based on the strategic
consideration that the aid would keep Russia busy in Finland and incapable of posing a threat to
Turkey and Romania, then allies of Great Britain and France. Schwartz also considered drawing
Norway and Sweden into the conflict as a vital consideration as well, though.37 On December
19, 1939, the Allied Supreme War Council met in Paris and decided that based on the reality of
Finland’s ability to defend itself, the Allies should offer all possible assistance to the Finns. This
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decision was based more upon seizing the Swedish iron ore mines and Norwegian transportation
of the ore than on any view of helping the Finns maintain national sovereignty.38 As Paul Doerr
has pointed out, by mid-March only one British brigade would actually have crossed the Swedish
border and entered into Finland to help fight the Soviets.39 Strategically, this was the logical
choice for the Allies to make. The Soviet Union was no ally of Great Britain and France; in
reality, the opposite was true, the Soviet Union was allied with Nazi Germany and supplying
Germany with the oil it needed to maintain its war machine. In fact, the Allied Powers would
play a major role in expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations as a result of the
Winter War.40 The Allies saw an opportunity in Finland to help cut off the oil the Germans
needed, as well as the iron ore vital for its steel production.
Great Britain and France were not the only countries that understood the critical impact
that Swedish iron ore had on German war production, though. Germany would remain neutral
throughout the Winter War but was always keeping an eye on the Allies and the Soviet Union to
ensure that German interests were not threatened. For instance, on January 13, 1940, less than
one month after the Allied Supreme War Council meeting, Adolf Hitler ordered an investigation
to look into a hypothetical occupation of Norway in order to protect Germany’s Swedish iron-ore
interests. On April 9, 1940, just weeks after the Winter War ended; Germany turned that
investigation into reality by invading Norway and Denmark.41 Observably, the Winter War had
a major impact upon German thinking in the early months of 1940, with protecting Swedish iron
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ore shipments being the main concern. On July 19, 1940, Hitler gave a speech in which he
justified the German invasion of Norway. In the speech he argued,
The conclusion of peace between Russia and Finland caused the contemplated action in
the Northern States to be withheld at the last moment; but a few days later these
intentions again became more definite and a final decision was reached. Britain and
France had agreed to carry out an immediate occupation of a number of the most
important points in Norway under the pretext of preventing Germany from benefiting
from further war supplies of Swedish ore.42
While this speech came months after the Winter War, it is relevant because Hitler framed Allied
intentions as having been formed during the Winter War and the Allied invasion of Sweden
would have occurred had the Winter War continued. The implication behind this statement is
that Germany’s occupation of Norway and Denmark was legitimate because it was a means of
protecting the German war economy from the Allies, whose true plans had not been to protect
the democracy and sovereignty of Finland, but rather, to cripple the German war economy. This
speech is important because it showed that Hitler understood all along what Great Britain and
France were really planning. The official German history of World War II, Germany and the
Second World War, confirms this view. Adolf Hitler had initially viewed the Winter War as an
advantage to German policies in the Balkans, as Stalin was tied down with Finland; however,
once the Allies began planning an advance into Scandinavia to help Finland and secure Swedish
iron ore, Hitler began to worry and ordered the study into an occupation of Norway.43 Hitler
understood what the Allies wanted to accomplish during the Winter War; an understanding that
would shape the way he handled the rest of the war.
As Hitler became more and more concerned about Soviet interests in Finland, peace
between Finland and the Soviet Union became more and more important to Hitler. Wipert von
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Blücher, the German ambassador in Finland, had pointed out early during the Winter War that
Scandinavian neutrality could not be counted on to prevent Swedish iron ore from falling into the
wrong hands. Sweden was within the grasp of both the Soviets and the Allies, which was a
matter of grave concern for Germany.44 Neither the occupation of Finland by the Soviet Union,
nor the continuation of the Winter War with the Allied powers now battling the Soviet Union in
Scandinavia were viewed as favorable developments. The latter alternative would not only cut
off Swedish iron ore shipments, it would also render the Soviet Union a useless ally, as it would
no longer have war material surpluses for Germany. The only reasonable course of action, from
the German perspective, was for peace. Field Marshal Hermann Goering attempted to persuade
the Finns to make peace with the Soviets in order to prevent Soviet occupation of Finland.
Goering even promised the Finns in March 1940 they would eventually regain whatever they
might lose in the peace to the Soviet Union, as war between the Soviet Union and Germany
would very soon break out.45 Essentially, Goering was telling the Finns to avoid further trouble
now so the Germans could help them in the future.
Although Adolf Hitler had always been driven by a desire to establish Lebensraum, living
space, in the western portions of the Soviet Union, the fact remains that at the outbreak of World
War II these plans had been at least temporarily suspended by the realities of the geopolitical
situation of the time.46 The Nazi-Soviet Pact had made allies out of the two nations. Hitler
recognized he needed Soviet help to defeat the Western powers; the Soviet Union could wait to
be conquered. The Winter War, however, forced Hitler to rethink his strategy. If the Soviet
Union could not even conquer a small state like Finland, how could it possibly stand up to the
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might of the Third Reich? While the Winter War was by no means the only reason Hitler
launched Operation Barbarossa, it certainly provided him the opportunity to see Soviet forces in
action; Hitler was not impressed.
Joseph Goebbels, Germany’s Propaganda Minister, recorded in his diary on November
11, 1939, “Russia’s army is not worth much. Badly led and even more poorly armed. We do not
need their military aid.”47 While Goebbels would go on in this entry to express gratitude that
Germany did not have to fight a two-front war, he did not express concern for the prospect of a
second, Russian front. This entry tells the modern scholar that even before the Winter War some
German leaders viewed the Red Army as weak and lacking the strength necessary for a true
world power. On January 5, 1940, Goebbels noted, “The Russians are making absolutely no
progress in Finland. The Red Army really does seem to be of very little military worth.” 48 It is
important to note that at this point the Winter War had been going on for over a month, which
implies that Goebbels’s view of the Red Army was becoming embedded in his mind: the Red
Army was seen as weak and inefficient in conquering even the smallest of states, Finland.
Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s Minister of Armaments and War Production, wrote in his
memoirs that Hitler first became aware of Red Army deficiencies when German troops met
Soviet troops on the demarcation line in Poland. This had a profound effect upon Hitler, as he
often quoted this as proof of a Soviet lack of strength. Speer also noted, “Soon afterward, the
failure of the Soviet offensive against Finland confirmed him in this view.”49 Once again here
was a top Nazi official, who was very close to Adolf Hitler, arguing that the Winter War had a
major impact on Hitler’s view of Red Army strength. The poor appearance of the Red Army in
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Poland was enough to initially put into Hitler’s mind that the Germans could succeed in an
invasion of the Soviet Union, but the Winter War confirmed this idea. Without the Winter War
it is possible that Hitler would not have invaded the Soviet Union until a much later time, but the
Winter War showed Hitler an invasion could be successful.
In the autumn of 1939, however, Hitler had no immediate plan to invade the Soviet
Union. Hitler wanted to keep Germany out of a war with the Soviet Union, even if it meant
giving up Finland and the Baltic states, traditional spheres of German influence.50 Hitler was
content to wage war with Great Britain and France and once they were brought under Nazi
control turn to his original goal of Lebensraum in the East. However, as Eloise Engle and Lauri
Paanenen argued, “For the Germans, had the Soviet Union not appeared so unfavorable, Hitler
would hardly have underestimated the war potential of the Russians to the extent he did.
Considering the enormous effort put forth by the Soviets in Finland, very little was received in
the way of results.”51 Richard J. Evans, famed Third Reich historian, also came to the same
conclusion arguing in his book The Third Reich at War, “[Finland’s] tough and effective
resistance had exposed the weakness of the Red Army and convinced Hitler that he had nothing
to fear from it.”52 On the other hand, Jukka Nevakivi has argued that the poor performance of
the Red Army was only as important, not more important, than the fact the German campaign
against the British was going so poorly. Nevakivi argued, “War against the Soviet Union would
have come sooner or later…If Hitler decided to start it in 1941…the reason was as much the lack
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of progress in his operations against England as the impression of a state of weakness given by
the Soviet Union in the Winter War, an advantage which he did not wish to lose.”53
It was not just the weak military showing of the Red Army during the Winter War that
persuaded Adolf Hitler to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa,’ it became obvious after the Winter
War that German and Soviet interests were eventually going to clash. Indeed, a November 25,
1940, statement made by Molotov illustrated what would become the crux of the deterioration in
German-Soviet relations. The statement was made to a German ambassador on the issue of a
possible Four-Power Pact, involving Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, and the
requirements that needed to be obtained before the Russians would sign it. The first requirement
was: “Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland, which, under
the agreements of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Here the Soviet
Union undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland and safeguard German economic
interests in Finland (export of lumber and nickel).”54 The period between the end of the Winter
War and the launching of ‘Operation Barbarossa’ was increasingly defined by the issue of
Finnish nickel and who was going to be in charge of that nickel.
H. Peter Krosby’s 1968 book, Finland, Germany and the Soviet Union: The
PetsamoDispute, argued that the Petsamo nickel question dominated the political relations
between Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union. The issue came down to who would be in
charge of the Finnish nickel mines in Petsamo, Germany or the Soviet Union? Krosby showed
this was the dominant issue in the diplomatic correspondence between Germany and Finland
following the Winter War. German military leaders had calculated that without Finnish nickel
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their war economy would collapse, making the Petsamo issue a top priority for the Germans.
Petsamo became a major issue when the Soviet Union decided that it was going to be in charge
of Petsamo, although giving a guarantee to Germany that it would honor the output of nickel
promised to the Germans. The Germans did not trust the Soviet’s with such a vital part of their
war economy and began planning for their armies in Norway to secure the Petsamo area once
‘Operation Barbarossa’ was launched.55
While Krosby did not argue that the Petsamo question was a factor in the decision to
launch ‘Operation Barbarossa,’ he did argue that by August of 1940 Hitler had decided if the
Russians attempted to annex Finland again, the Germans would occupy Petsamo and begin
arming the Finns. Krosby argued, “Hitler was not yet ready to take on the Soviet Union in a total
conflict of arms, but he was willing to risk a quarrel over Petsamo if necessary.”56 General Franz
Halder’s diary concurs with Krosby’s interpretation. After the August 26, 1940, conference with
the Fuehrer, Halder noted, “Finland would get arms and ammunition from us. In the event of a
Russian attack against Finland, we shall occupy Petsamo.”57 From this one can infer that whether
or not Hitler was ready to take on the Soviet Union, occupying Petsamo and arming the Finns
would have begun the conflict. This is where Krosby made a mistake in his reasoning, he did not
envisage what would occur once the Germans occupied Petsamo, or what that occupation would
mean; effectively, that Germany would be at war with the Soviet Union. Obviously, these
August decisions by Hitler were of momentous importance, yet they have been left out of many
scholarly works on the Second World War, including Gorodetsky’s account. This has been an
oversight because these decisions show that by August 1940, Hitler was not just planning and
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scheming, he was ready to take action against the Red Army if his hand was forced. The August
decision to occupy Petsamo, if necessary, and the implications it necessitated, effectively, adds
validity to Hitler’s July 31, 1940, decision to begin planning for an invasion of Russia. Although
some historians have considered this not yet a “point of no return;” they have conceded that the
interests of Finland and Romania had to be safeguarded as a result of that decision.58
Official Finnish documents show that the Soviet Union had began to insist on control of
the Petsamo nickel mines on June 23, 1940, and from that point on it became a constant strain on
German, Finnish, and Soviet relations.59 By June 27, 1940, the Soviets had informed the Finns
that they were not interested in the actual nickel; rather, the Soviet Union was interested in the
area itself and controlling the nickel within the area for “all time.”60 The Germans had been
ensured by the Finns that the Petsamo nickel mines would be operated primarily for German
usage; after June 27, though, the Germans now had to worry about their nickel supplies. Hitler
would begin to plan for an invasion of the Soviet Union in July, and it would be irrational to
believe that this event had nothing to do with that decision. This connection was especially
relevant considering that Hitler was ready by August to take action if the Soviet Union tried to
invade Finland again.
On October 30, 1940, the Soviet Union began threatening Finland in regards to the
Petsamo nickel mines. Paasikivi sent a telegram to the Finnish Foreign Ministry on that day that
in response to the Finnish claims that they could not give the concession to the Soviet Union
because of the concession already made to the British, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinski
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told Paasikivi, “in that case the USSR would be compelled to take the measures which the
situation demanded.”61 At this point, then, the Petsamo issue had ceased to be unimportant, but
rather was a possible casus belli. The Germans could not sit back and watch the Russians
pressure and threaten Finland, at least not over an issue that directly affected their military
abilities. The Germans were still trying to defeat the British and had been planning for the
invasion of Russia for months at this point. To lose the nickel from Finland would have been too
much for the Germans to accept. The Germans had also, it should be remembered, decided in
August that they would take action if Russia took up arms against Finland.
Further, a January 1941 conversation between Hitler and the Italian dictator Benito
Mussolini furthers this argument. At the Berghof, Hitler indicated that Germany would have
gone further in supporting Finland against Russia. “The Russians, [Hitler] said, had agreed to let
Germany have the necessary nickel supplies but would not hold to their agreement any longer
than suited them; therefore, he could not permit further Soviet encroachments in Finland.”62
What beyond the occupation of Petsamo Hitler would have risked will never be known; but it is
obvious that Hitler would have gone to war in August 1940 if the Russians had tried to annex the
Finns. Hitler would not have allowed the nickel, so vital to his war machine, to go without a
fight, primarily because in his mind Scandinavia was the keystone of his empire.63 It is not much
of a jump to conclude that in Hitler’s mind Finland was worth launching a war for, as evidenced
by his statements and his actions.
In August 1940, Field Marshal Feodor von Bock wrote in his diary about the state of
German foreign relations at that point. Bock stated, “Russia had once shown a tendency to go
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beyond the agreements with us, however at the moment she is loyal…Should she prepare to
crush Finland or attack Romania we would be forced to intervene. Russia must not be allowed to
become the sole master of the Eastern Baltic and we need the Romanian oil.”64 Here is another
example of top German leadership in August 1940 insinuating that Germany would not allow the
Soviet Union to interfere in Finland without German intervention. This is another example of
how Gorodetsky got the circumstances wrong because it showed it was not just Romania and the
Balkans the German leadership were concerned about, but rather they were worried about the
Baltic and Finland as well. Bock finished the entry by stating, “But perhaps sending a German
General with a “provocative” name to the east would be enough to keep Russia quiet.”65 This
conclusion showed that Bock was not fully convinced that the Germans needed to go to war at
that time, but they needed to start acting to safeguard their interests.
The head of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, wrote in his memoirs of Hitler’s decision to
go to war with the Soviet Union this way:
His reply, in brief, was that he had never lost sight of the inevitability of a clash between
the world’s two most diametrically opposed ideologies, that he did not believe it could be
evaded, and that that being the case it was better for him to shoulder this grave burden
now, in addition to the others, than for him to bequeath it to his successor. Besides, he
believed there were indications that Russia was already girding herself for war with us,
and she had certainly far overreached the agreements we had made on the Baltic
provinces and Bessarabia while our hands had been tied in the west. In any case, he said,
he only wanted to take precautions against being taken by surprise, and he would not
reach any decisions until he had recognised how justified his distrust of them was.66
This reminiscence from a conversation he had with Hitler illustrated many things about the
reasons for going to war with the Soviet Union. First, as Gorodetsky argued, the decision was
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not based solely upon Nazi ideology that could be traced back to Mein Kampf, rather it was
based upon the realities of the geopolitical events of the time. Hitler told Keitel that he did not
think he could shoulder the burden of not taking precautions against the Soviet Union because of
the Soviet actions in Bessarabia and the Baltic. It is important to remember that in terms of
German-Soviet relations Finland was included in the Baltic bloc of nations. Essentially, this
conversation indicated that the decision to invade the Soviet Union was based more upon the
realities of German-Soviet relations and preventing the Soviets from taking raw materials the
Germans needed from Finland and Rumania. The conclusion that Hitler would not take any
action until his distrust was justified showed that Hitler needed a little more encouragement to
commit to the invasion; that encouragement would come in November, 1940.
In describing the November 1940 Molotov visit to Berlin, Gerhard Weinberg phrased it
best in his 1954 book, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941; “ of the thirty-six pages
compromising the memoranda on Molotov’s conversations with Hitler… seven are taken up by
rather acrimonious debate about the…interests of Russia and Germany in Finland. Before the
decision to attack Russia, Germany had been willing to see the Soviets conquer that country;
now they meant to protect it as an ally for the coming war.”67 The November visit would
finalize German plans on what to do about the Soviet Union; if there had been any thought of
avoiding a conflict, it ended in November. The main problem that arose during the talks was the
issue of Finland and Hitler’s demand that Molotov indicate what the Soviet intentions were for
Finland. Molotov requested that Hitler remove German troops that were on their way to Norway
from Finland. When Hitler asked him what the Soviet intentions towards Finland were Molotov
responded that the Soviets wanted a settlement in the same manner as Bessarabia, which the
Soviet’s had annexed months prior to the conference. Hitler responded to this that there must not
67

Gerhard Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954), 128.

33

be any war in Finland because it would have severe repercussions on German-Soviet relations.68
As Stephen Fritz has pointed out, Molotov even pressed Hitler about German actions in Romania
and Finland and how they had violated the 1939 German-Soviet agreement, which lead Fritz to
the conclusion that Hitler had decided by the second day of the meeting that German and Soviet
interests were not compatible.69 Essentially, the meeting can be seen as Germany’s warning that
they would not allow Finland to be annexed by the Soviet Union.
General Heinz Guderian wrote of Molotov’s November visit in his memoirs, Panzer
Leader. Guderian argued that Molotov had demanded that the Germans recognize the Soviet
interests in Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Dardanelles, and that an agreement was to be
made in regards to the future of Poland. Hitler, according to Guderian, was “highly incensed” by
the Russian claims. Guderian wrote, “The conclusion [Hitler] drew from Molotov’s visit and its
results was a belief that war with the Soviet Union must sooner or later be inevitable. He was to
describe to me repeatedly the course that the Berlin conference took; I have given his version
here.”70 The implication from this passage is that Finland and the November negotiations played
a role in Hitler’s decision to go to war with the Soviet Union. While Gorodetsky and other
historians have placed the blame solely on events in the Balkans as the driving force in that
decision; Guderian makes it apparent that it was not solely the Balkans, but rather the
international situation as a whole that Hitler took into consideration in declaring war.
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The November visit had not accomplished the renewal of relations that the Soviet’s were
hoping for. The initial Finnish view of the meeting was published in the 1941 book, Finland
Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy. This book was a compilation of documents
from March 1940 to June 1941 and was prefaced by the Finnish ambassador to the United States,
Hjalmar J. Procopé. The book argued, “The aims of the USSR in regard to Finland found a
striking expression during the visit of…Molotov to Berlin in November, 1940. In the course of
the negotiations…Molotov proposed that the USSR should be allowed to attack Finland a second
time, without interference by Germany.”71 While this was clearly propaganda, it is also
illustrative of the way the Finnish government, and to an extent the German government, saw the
actions and suggestions of the Soviet government. After all, the Soviets just after the November
talks in Berlin had lied to the Finns on November 19 and told them that Germany had consented
to Russia gaining the concession to the nickel mines in Petsamo and would not stand in the way
of a Russian takeover of the mines.72 Clearly, Hitler had made no such concession and had only
a few months before in August decided the Petsamo nickel mines were worth launching an early
invasion of the Soviet Union. It is interesting that this should happen between the Molotov visit
and the issuing of Directive No. 21, considering the Finns had informed the Germans of
Molotov’s lie. In fact, during the post-war interrogations Ribbentrop even suggested that the
fallout over Finland during the November meeting had been one of the factors determining the
decision to invade the Soviet Union; although Ribbentrop himself stated he was opposed to such
an action.73
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A little over a month after Molotov’s visit to Berlin Hitler on December 18, 1940, issued
his “Directive No. 21,” which called for ‘Operation Barbarossa.’ The directive opened by
stating, “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick
campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of the war against England.”74 The
decision had been made, now all that remained was to implement ‘Operation Barbarossa’ in the
following spring. As far as Finland was concerned, the Directive stated, “On the flanks of our
operation we can count on the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war against
Soviet Russia.”75 Thus, the Germans were already assured that Finland would play an active role
in the invasion of the Soviet Union. Directive No. 21 is important because the timing of its
release showed that the invasion of Russia was not merely an ideological event; rather, the
invasion was a calculated attempt by Hitler and the German leadership to ensure that their main
suppliers of raw materials, Romania and Finland, would remain free to comply with German
wishes. Obviously, then, the decision to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa’ can be seen as being
directly affected by the Molotov visit, as well as events in the Balkans; not solely the ideological
fantasies of Adolf Hitler.
A distinction should be made between the German desire to include both Romania and
Finland into its operational plans for the East. Finnish historian Michael Jonas has argued that
Romania was incorporated into the German plans specifically for its oil reserves, which were the
second largest in Europe at this time. This is why Hitler’s first order in Romania was for the oil
fields to be occupied and secured for German use. Militarily, the Romanians had little to offer
the Germans; Romanian troops were seen as cowardly, useless, and lacking discipline in the Nazi
eyes. Indeed, retreating Romanian troops were regularly abused, along with Italian and
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Hungarian troops, by German forces; sometimes with hand grenades thrown at them by the
German troops. The Finnish, in comparison, were valued not just for the critical resource of
nickel, but for their military strengths. The Winter War had shown the value of Finland as a
military ally and Hitler was very fond of Marshal Mannerheim as “the embodiment of the antiBolshevist Finnish soldier.” As Jonas argued, “While in the Romanian case war economic
considerations dominated military planning, the case of Finland appeared much more complex.
A high German opinion of Finnish military capacities and comparatively blunt economic
calculations seem to have been kept in a carefully calibrated balance throughout.”76 Jonas’s
argument furthers the notion that Finland was a special case, in terms of Nazi relations, and
should be studied as a separate case.
According to Gorodetsky events in the Balkans, specifically Soviet actions in Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, and Bessarabia, all precipitated the decision to invade the Soviet Union. However,
as can clearly be seen, both the July 1940 decision and Directive No. 21 were issued well before
the events in Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, meaning these events had little impact on the initial
decision to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa.’ However, Gorodetsky’s argument in favor of the
annexation of Bessarabia is still a valid point, but it needs to be put into the proper context that it
shared equal importance with Finland in the decision to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa.’
Historians have for far too long understated the importance Finland had upon the German
decision to go to war with the Soviet Union. It is clear that Finland was not the sole driving
force behind the decision, but Finland did play a critical role in shaping that force. As Anatole
Mazour pointed out in his book Finland: Between East and West, “The experience of the Winter
War taught the Finns one lesson—Sweden would not give the military aid that was required to
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halt Soviet encroachment. A second lesson…[was that] Soviet demands continued to be pressed
in regard to transit privileges in order to link the home base with the recently acquired one at
Hanko.”77 The Finns realized that if they were to survive another Winter War experience they
were going to have to reenter the German sphere of influence. At the same time Germany
realized its interests in Finland were continuously threatened by Soviet action against Finland.
The Soviet response was, as Mazour put it, “The more Helsinki and Berlin drew together, the
greater became the fear in Moscow and eagerness to find additional insurance against a German
place d’armes in Finland. In June the Soviet government began to insist upon a controlling share
in the Petsamo Nickel Company.”78
The Finland situation, then, can clearly be shown as one of the major breaking points in
German-Soviet relations. As the Finns moved closer to the Germans, the Soviets moved further
from both the Germans and the Finns. Desperation on both sides was beginning to show. The
German August 1940 decision to occupy Petsamo if the Soviet Union invaded Finland once
again showed that the Germans now recognized two things: Finland’s nickel output was
absolutely essential, even worth the risk of an early war with the Soviet Union; and the Germans
had seen an alliance with the Soviet Union was not good for their interests in Scandinavia. The
role the Finns played in the decision to invade the Soviet Union has continued to be one of the
most under covered aspects of World War II amongst English-speaking historians, despite the
abundance of evidence of the importance Finland played in the years 1939 to 1944.
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CHAPTER 3
SWEDEN: THE NATION THAT KEPT ADOLF HITLER AFLOAT
Sweden has, after all, done more for the German war effort than is generally assumed.
More particularly, Sweden has given us valuable support in our fight against the Soviet
Union. While she insists on remaining neutral, that after all is very much in our favor.
There can be no doubt but that she would defend her neutrality by force of arms in case
we tried to put her under pressure.79 Joseph Goebbels, January 28, 1942
The English intended establishing a connection with the eastern theater of war via
Sweden. But the Swedes are determined to oppose by force of arms anybody who attacks
their territory. At least that’s what they say today. It would have been better if we had
also taken Sweden during our campaign in the north. This state has no right to national
existence anyway.80 Joseph Goebbels, April 15, 1942
These quotations from German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’s diary illustrate
well the ambiguities and tensions in the German-Swedish relationship during World War II. In
the first quotation Goebbels praised Sweden for all she had done for the German war effort,
primarily in the supply of iron ore and allowing Germany to transfer troops through Sweden.
These actions had helped the Germans wage war successfully up to that point. By the middle of
April 1942, though, Goebbels had changed his mind. The Swedes had become a problem in
Goebbels’s mind, primarily because the Germans worried whether Sweden would remain neutral
throughout the continuation of the war. These diary entries are symbolic of Sweden’s Second
World War experience, as Sweden began the war as one of Germany’s favorite nations and
would end the war as a constant nuisance to the Germans. This chapter will first examine
Sweden as a favorite of the Germans, when Sweden was supplying Germany with the necessary
iron ore to continue the war. Then the chapter will shift its focus, much as Swedish-German
relations did in response to the vagaries of war, and illustrate the tensions in the relationship,
especially as the Swedes actively hindered the success of the Final Solution in Scandinavia.
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Throughout the analysis of these topics, close attention will be placed upon how historians and
academics have interpreted these events, specifically how Anglo-American historians have
viewed these events.
In 1939, the German economy appeared to be growing. The Anschluss with Austria, as
well as the incorporation of Czechoslovakia, had increased German industrial strength and
agricultural output. As the official German history of World War II argued:
Although the economic domination which Germany had now attained over the countries
of south-east Europe had brought the regime a good step nearer to the establishment of its
large-scale economic area, [German] economic strength thus acquired was still not
sufficient—with any reasonable hope of success—either for a war of revenge against
France, with the risk of British involvement, or for a struggle for living-space in the east,
i.e. against the Soviet Union, which was itself conducting mutual-aid negotiations with
the Western powers.81
This would become important because Germany realized well before the invasion of Poland that
the German economy would require an expansion of raw materials. The ability to wage war had
not been increased by the territorial acquisitions thus achieved. Adolf Hitler recognized this and
understood that Germany needed to continue focusing on gaining the raw materials that would be
essential to fighting the Allied Powers or the Soviet Union. Before the German decision to
invade Poland had been finalized there had been concern from many high-level Nazis that
Germany could not fight a long war because of its raw material deficiencies, Hitler, though, used
these deficiencies as a reason to invade Poland. In Hitler’s mind the Germans would benefit
from the added Polish raw materials, whereas postponing the invasion would allow Great Britain
and other major world powers the opportunity to continue mobilizing at a higher speed than
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Germany.82 Richard Overy has argued that upon the invasion of Poland Hitler did not expect
war to break out. Hitler thought the Allied Powers would simply grant him what he wanted and
move on. The invasion of Poland was undertaken so that Nazi Germany would have a core base
of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to draw resources from for a future long-term war
against either the Allied Powers or Soviet Russia. A war with Great Britain and France was not
supposed to start as a result of the invasion of Poland because the Nazi-Soviet Pact would act as
a check on a Western response.83
The main economic policy of Nazi Germany leading up to the Second World War was
the Four Year Plan, which called for Germany to become independent of other countries
economically. As William Ebenstein argued in 1943, though, “The Four Year Plan was never
designed to be a permanent solution for Germany’s problem of raw materials…The sole purpose
of the Four Year Plan was to make sure that Germany would win the second World War…after
victory all raw materials would be at the disposal of the German master race in an enslaved
world.”84 Ebenstein’s argument implies that the Anschluss with Austria and the occupation of
Czechoslovakia were undertaken as a way to increase the material wealth of the German Reich
in order to be capable of fighting the long war against Great Britain and France or the Soviet
Union. This is an important idea to comprehend because it allows one to fully understand what
Nazi intentions were heading into 1939. The goal was not to start a major war, but instead the
goal was to gain Polish raw materials that could be used to strengthen Germany for a future war.
As Ebenstein pointed out, the theory of the Nazi war economy, Wehrwirtschaft, was to obtain the
means for total war during peace time. Obtaining the resources under peace would allow the
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Germans to prepare for the long war, the lack of such preparations was something leading
German economists and military leaders believed had cost them victory in the First World War.85
Hitler himself shed light on the issue of gaining the independence of raw materials
through the acquisition of other territories. In his New Years Proclamation speech to the German
population on January 1, 1939, Hitler argued, “The third task we see in the execution of the Four
Years Plan, is the solution of the problem of labour shortage, and, above all, in the economic
incorporation of the new territories of the Reich.”86 The context of this comment was Adolf
Hitler telling the German people what the major problems Germany had to solve in 1939. The
foreign territories that are mentioned were Austria and the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia.
What this speech was essentially saying in terms of economics was that Germany was going to
incorporate these nations’ raw materials into the German system in order to continue the building
up of the Wehrwirtschaft. The economic incorporation of these territories was of the utmost
importance because Hitler understood that the Reich needed these materials if Germany was to
achieve an economy capable of fighting Great Britain and France or the Soviet Union. This was
also the stated goal for 1939, the year that the Germans would attempt to incorporate another
nation into the Reich, Poland.
The only way that Germany could continue building the Wehrwirtschaft was by
continuing the expansion of German dominated territory. This, though, does not mean that
Germany moved on Poland with the intention of starting a world war. As Gerhard Weinberg
argued, “Hitler was preparing for a series of wars each of which Germany would win by
launching a quick campaign against an isolated enemy, with victory in each such war helping

85

Ebenstein, 237-238.
Adolf Hitler, “New Year Proclamation to the German People on 1 January 1939” in The Speeches of
Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939 Vol. II trans. and ed. Norman H. Baynes (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969),
1561.
86

42

prepare for the next one by increasing Germany’s resources and terrifying others into submission
or at least abstention from intervention.”87 A grand war was never the strategy, just a local war
with Poland. This would lead to other wars, including against Great Britain and France, but
those would be for the future, after Germany had incorporated the resources of Poland into the
Reich. Unfortunately for Hitler and Nazi Germany, Great Britain and France would not let
Poland be occupied without a fight, and on September 3, 1939, they would declare war on
Germany.
As a result of Great Britain and France declaring war, Hitler had to consolidate and
protect the areas that were providing the Nazi war machine with raw materials. The
incorporation into the Reich of new territories in order to enrich the Wehrwirtschaft had been the
primary goal of Nazi policy in the late 1930s. With a major war came the realization that the
Reich simply did not have enough raw materials to wage a war against the combined might of
Great Britain and France. One of the key raw materials to fighting these powers would be iron
ore. In this way, Sweden would become one of the most important countries of the Second
World War despite being neutral throughout the conflict. Without Swedish iron ore the Nazi’s
could not have waged war.
Sweden and her iron ore became important to the German economy because of the
quality and easy access Germany had to it. By 1939, Sweden accounted for over half of the iron
ore imported into Germany; Sweden’s importance was also strengthened by the fact that once
war began, Great Britain and France could choose to halt their exportation of iron ore to
Germany.88 The importation of Swedish iron ore would rise from 3.3 million tons in 1935 to
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5.45 million in 1937 and to 6.2 million in 1939.89 The importation of Swedish iron ore rose as
the Wehrwirtschaft continued to grow. It can then be argued that the importation of Swedish
iron ore was rising because Hitler was preparing Germany for the long war by greatly increasing
German production of armaments and other war goods. In this long war German industrialists
would need access to large amounts of the highest grade of iron ore in Europe in order to make
the war materials that the German army would need to conquer its foes.
To fully understand how important Swedish iron ore was to Germany, one only needs to
look to the year 1940. Germany had traditionally enjoyed good economic relations with Sweden,
but Sweden was not Germany’s only trading partner in terms of iron ore. Germany also acquired
iron ore from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and even Spain. When the war began, though,
Germany found itself with a 40 percent drop in its iron ore importation. As Burton H. Klein has
pointed out, “Had the Allies been able to cut off Swedish iron ore supplies, as was feared in
Germany, the German steel industry could not have operated at more than 50 per cent of capacity
during 1940 without depleting ore and scrap stocks.”90 In reality, this means that the Swedes
kept the German war economy functional during the early stages of the war. 1940 alone
represents the impact that Swedish iron ore had on Germany because it was a year in which
Sweden was the only major supplier of iron ore to Germany.
Hitler and the Nazi military leaders had never entertained any plans of conquering
Sweden or other Scandinavian areas. In the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt’s history of
the war Klaus A. Maier argued that although the German navy had been interested in widening
its base of operations into Scandinavia in order to escape the British control of the Atlantic while
simultaneously securing iron ore imports from Sweden, there had been no operational plans
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drawn up before the war.91 This region was never intended to be a part of German plans of
conquest in the way that Czechoslovakia or Poland had been. Gunnar Hägglӧf, who served in
the Swedish Foreign Ministry during World War II, has pointed out that the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement of 1935 had led to the British renouncing any influence in the Baltic and had
thus furthered Hitler’s belief that this had made Germany into the master of the Baltic; therefore,
to the Germans, Sweden was to provide the Reich with all of the iron ore it would need.92 On the
face of it, there was no reason for Germany to become involved in Scandinavia, since Germany
informally controlled the area and it supplied enough iron ore to build its war machine. When
the long war broke out early, though, Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia became extremely
important to a Reich that had not conquered the necessary territories to defeat Great Britain and
France. Indeed, the Wehrmacht High Command had already conducted a study on April 29,
1939, that came to the conclusion that during a war iron ore shipments from Sweden would fall
because of the threat of British blockade. Even if imports only fell by 3 million tons, the
Wehrmacht High Command concluded that this would not be acceptable for a war that lasted
longer than six months.93
Hitler would not be in trouble during the invasion of Poland as long as the Allies
continued the policy of appeasement and stayed uninvolved in the conflict. Poland would resist
German occupation, but the German military understood this conflict would not last longer than
six months. Hitler was confident that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union would
prevent Great Britain and France from entering the conflict. When the Allies declared war,
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though, the short war that would not exceed six months became the long war that Hitler was not
prepared for. The study that the Wehrmacht High Command had conducted would become
important as Hitler and other top Nazi officials understood the gravity of the situation they now
found themselves in. It was for this reason that the Germans sought to protect Swedish iron ore
at all costs.
The importance of Swedish iron ore would manifest itself into the German operation for
the invasion of Norway and Denmark, Weserübung. German Admiral Erich Raeder had long
been campaigning for the invasion of these nations in order to protect the vital raw materials that
Scandinavia generated for the German economy, principally Swedish iron ore and Finnish
nickel. The Norwegian port of Narvik was one of the few areas that could ship these resources
all year round and Raeder believed it was of the utmost importance to protect this shipping lane,
especially once war broke out with Great Britain and France. Hitler, though, at an April 1
conference with his military leaders suggested that Operation Weserübung was important not just
for protecting these raw materials. Hitler attempted to link the invasion of Norway to the bigger
picture of the long war by arguing to his generals that the invasion would finally allow Germany
access to the open sea. In Hitler’s opinion it was intolerable that Germany should have to be
confronted, generation after generation, with British pressure in naval matters. Hitler argued that
Weserübung was part of a larger operation against the British that was an inevitable conflict,
especially after the British declaration of war. Indeed, as Maier argued these occupations of
Denmark and Norway were intended to become permanent, as these nations would be brought
within Greater Germany, and were not just temporary wartime exigency.94
Swedish iron ore was so vital to the German war economy because, as Martin Fritz has
shown, the high quality of the ore meant less ore had to be shipped. This relieved the German
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transportation bottleneck that had long been plaguing German industry.95 The idea that Sweden
prolonged the war because of her trade with Germany comes from this indisputable fact.
However, Germany was not receiving the iron ore for free, as Germany was trading large sums
of coal for that ore. As Fritz pointed out, many historians who have argued that Sweden
prolonged the war have failed to realize the huge impact this coal trade had on the Wehrmacht
and the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht was running low on coal throughout the
invasion of the Soviet Union, which hampered success.96 Of course, Fritz does not expand on
this argument, but it is worth mentioning, especially considering how many Swedish historians
have argued the immorality of the Swedish government’s actions during the Second World War.
Remembering that Sweden was totally isolated from the rest of the world and was receiving
large quantities of desperately needed coal from Germany in exchange for iron ore should temper
somewhat the critical view of some historians that Sweden provided iron ore to Nazi Germany
primarily to enable that country to conduct war. Instead, the reality was more about survival as a
sovereign, if not quite fully autonomous, nation.
In his book The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze argued that Swedish iron ore was
vital to the German war economy because if shipments from Sweden had stopped following the
invasion of Poland, the German armaments industry would have been “subject to a drastic
squeeze” during the autumn of 1940 at the latest.97 Tooze also points out that there was no real
threat of Germany losing Sweden’s support because of the fact that Germany was Sweden’s
main supplier of coal. Sweden, then, was never in any danger of turning from pro-German
neutrality because of the economic reality of Swedish reliance on German coal. Tooze then
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argued that the danger of losing Swedish iron ore lay in a British invasion of Norway and
detailed the German invasion and defeat of Britain in Norway.98 What is most striking about
Tooze’s analysis of Sweden’s key role is its brevity. Tooze conceded that without Swedish iron
ore the Germans could not have made it past the autumn of 1940 but does not spend any time
actually analyzing this situation in his book. This is representative of the problem in the Englishspeaking historiography of the Second World War and Sweden’s role in the war. No American
or British historian adequately covers this aspect of the war in any detail. It is simply argued that
Swedish iron ore was valuable to the German war economy and Norway was invaded to protect
this iron ore with little interest in the full implications of this assertion.
The non-English historiography of the Second World War has long debated if Sweden
could have ended the war by cutting off iron ore shipments to the Germans. In 1965 Rolf
Karlbom authored an article that argued that if the Swedish mines had ceased working following
the German invasion of Poland up to the fall of France, than the German industrial sector would
have shut down as well. Essentially, Karlbom argued that the Swedes had allowed World War II
to happen by sticking with neutrality and not shutting the Nazi’s out of the iron ore trade. This,
of course, would incite many academics to argue against Karlbom’s thesis, including Alan
Milward and Jӧrg-Johannes Jäger. Milward argued that Karlbom’s figures were wrong by
pointing out that Germany’s consumption of Swedish iron ore dropped from 51 percent in the
last three months of 1939 to just over 25 percent in the first three months of 1940, which showed
that rather than being the essential factor in Germany’s ability to wage war in the early period,
Swedish iron ore actually ceased to be as important as in the beginning. In addition, Milward
pointed out that German stockpiles were high enough before the invasion of France to survive
the lack of imports of iron ore. Jäger also attacked Karlbom’s figures, arguing that Karlbom
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based his numbers on pre-1938 German borders and not the actual Germany that included
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and parts of Poland.99 While the idea that Sweden could have stopped
the war before the fall of France has been disproven by historians and academics, the idea that
Swedish iron ore allowed the German army to accomplish all that it did is one of the few aspects
of World War II that all historians agree on.
Rolf-Dieter Müller has made a different argument than most historians on the question of
Swedish iron ore and Germany. Müller asserted that the German economy following the
invasion of Poland was faced with a raw material crisis. Up to this point, the Germans had
conquered territories that yielded very little in terms of raw materials that could sustain a long
war. As a result, Germany found itself in a “Gordian knot,” where arms manufacturers were
suffering from a shortage of iron that was caused by the erratic deliveries from Sweden of iron
ore. The solution to this Gordian knot was to replace the erratic deliveries from Sweden with the
iron-ore producing regions of Belgium and northern France as soon as possible. Müller
concludes that this was the fundamental problem with the German war economy, instead of
rationalizing the production of war materials and alleviating shortages of materials, the German
leadership decided territorial expansion into Belgium and France was the better solution.100
Müller, then, was arguing that the Germans based their decision to invade the West in part upon
the need to solve the iron ore crisis they were facing. This is important because concerns for raw
materials have seldom been seen as a driving factor in the decision to invade France. Müller’s
theory is also important because it changes the way Sweden is viewed during the early stages of
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World War II. If this line of thinking is correct, then Sweden was not as critical to the German
ability to wage war as initially thought if Germany was attempting to solve its iron ore crisis with
the ore of Belgium and France.
In regards to Müller’s theory that the invasion of France was undertaken to shore up the
necessary iron ore that Sweden was unable to supply, many things must be stressed. First, the
idea of a German-dominated European continent had been floating around in Germany since the
1920s. It was always a part of Nazi strategy to run the continent, not a reaction to the situation in
Sweden. Second, Müller’s theory is not backed up by the most recent major study of the
German economy during the Second World War, Tooze’s The Wages of Destruction. Tooze
argued that the conquest of France had developed many economic possibilities that had not
seemed possible before 1939 but never postulates that the invasion was undertaken solely for
economic gain. In fact, Tooze points out that the invasion was more ideologically driven and
was an attempt to break the alleged International Jewish conspiracy that Hitler saw in the
alliance of Great Britain, France, and the United States and personified in ‘the chosen one’
President Franklin Roosevelt.101 However, as English-speaking authors have failed to
adequately study Sweden during the Second World War, it cannot be assumed that Müller’s
theory is wrong. Müller based his argument on not only the realities of the German economy
before the invasion of France but also on evidence from Hermann Gӧring, particularly a memo
from a conversation between Gӧring and General Georg Thomas, head of the OKW armaments
office, that showed Gӧring telling Thomas to prepare for the invasion with France as soon as
possible because of the iron ore problem. The Führer had decided, according to Gӧring, to make
use of the stockpiles of raw materials in order to launch the invasion. This plan was accepted by
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Thomas and implementation began.102 The fact that this has not been covered more by historians
proves the contention of this thesis that more attention should be paid by English-speaking
historians to Scandinavia and its role in World War II.
Swedish historian Gunnar Åselius has argued that the way Sweden is viewed in the
Second World War needs to be changed. Instead of focusing on Sweden during the 1930s and
1940s, scholars should push the time frame back to the Franco-Prussian war. According to
Åselius, this longer time period allows Sweden to be seen as adapting to the new, developing
world power, Germany. After all, from 1870 world history can be viewed as Germany, Italy,
and Japan trying to join, emulate, or usurp the old order and assert their power. Åselius has also
pointed out that the Swedish orientation towards Germany at this time was not just a political
reaction to the growing power in that region, but it was also an economic reaction. Sweden
began industrializing after Germany had become the leading industrial nation in Europe.
Sweden’s industry, then, was modeled on the German system and this created close economic tie
between the two countries. These economic ties, according to Åselius, led to closer cultural ties.
German became the primary second language Swedish students learned and many Swedish
teachers and professors studied abroad in Germany. In fact, most of the Swedish decision
makers, military, political, and business, from 1933 to 1945 had studied in Germany and had
close cultural ties with Germany.103 Still, Nina Witoszek and Lars Trägårdh have shown that
while Germany and Sweden might have had close economic and cultural ties and developed a
shared ideology of a type of national socialism following the economic crisis of the 1930s,
Hitler’s Germany and Per Albin Hansson’s Sweden developed into two very separate nations,
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“True, even a cursory review of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century developments in
Germany or Sweden reveals a number of affinities in the spheres of science, education, art,
politics, and myth-making,” they argue. “Yet, for all their mutual cross-fertilization, Sweden and
Germany embraced two opposing self-images and followed two different trajectories of
modernization.”104
The most important thing about Åselius’s work is that it has changed the way scholars
look at Sweden. Most of the studies of Sweden during the Second World War focus on the
morality of neutrality, which Stig Ekman has argued is the dominant trend in the Swedish
historiography of the Second World War.105 Åselius’s work, though, has expanded the time
frame in order to fully understand why Sweden was in Germany’s orbit. This has shown that
Sweden had a long history of cooperation with the Germans, and the two cultures were tied
together. This helps explain why Sweden could justify the continued shipments of iron ore to the
Germans or grant them transit rights through Sweden, since they had a historical memory of a
benevolent Germany with whom Sweden benefitted from mutual cooperation. In many ways,
Åselius’s work has helped to transcend the morality argument by showing that Sweden had
enjoyed relations with Germany since 1870, which makes it obvious how they would react in
1939.
Another way of viewing Sweden’s policies during the Second World War is to
understand not just Swedish history back to the 1870s, but to understand how Sweden
experienced the First World War. The Swedish Government wanted to differentiate its policy of
neutrality between the First World War and the Second World War in order to avoid the mistakes
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of the past. These mistakes primarily included shortages of food and supplies as a result of strict
neutrality and the questionable legality of the British blockade that had made life hard on the
average Swede. As a result, as Alf Johansson has pointed out, Sweden would use neutrality
during the Second World War as a means of staying out of the war but would not strictly follow
the policy of neutrality when dealing with the belligerents. During this conflict, Sweden would
pay close attention to the reality of the war and bend its policy of neutrality towards the stronger
side. “In other words, there was no willingness to fight for neutrality law as such in 1939. In
that sense, it can be said that the policy of concessions was inherent in the Swedish political
attitude from the very outset.”106 Johansson would also argue that the humanitarian actions of
Sweden in terms of the Holocaust cannot wipe away the shame of the concessions that Sweden
awarded Nazi Germany during the war.107
While much work still needs to be done on the scholarship of Swedish iron ore and its
contribution to Germany’s war effort, at least it has now become a topic of discussion on the
Second World War. Much the same observation could be made about a second area in which
Sweden played an outsized role during the war, the Holocaust. Many people know the story of
the Swede Raoul Wallenberg and how he saved tens of thousands of Jews from being deported
from Hungary. What many people do not know, academics included, is the story of how Sweden
saved the Danish Jews. This was a story from the Holocaust that was hardly ever mentioned
until the turn of the century. For instance, famed Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer only
devoted one and a half pages to the rescue of the Danish Jews in the revised 2001 version of the
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classic A History of the Holocaust.108 Now, thanks to a new generation of historians, this story is
finally being told in full. While saving a few thousand Jews might not seem like a grand
accomplishment, these were thousands of Jews more than most countries saved. The future
historiography on Sweden during World War II and the historiography of the Holocaust should
continue the discussion started by some recent works.
The first Swedish historian who investigated anti-Semitism was Hugo Valentin, whose
book Antisemitism: Historically and Critically Examined laid the basis for Swedish ethnic and
genocidal studies. The book is not so much a work on anti-Semitism in general as it is a book
written in 1936 on anti-Semitism, meaning it focuses almost solely on Germany and the rise of
the Nazis. In fact, Swedish anti-Semitism is not even mentioned in the book except to point out
that Sweden’s Jewish population was only 0.1 percent of the total population. Even this is only
stated in order to show the reader a comparison of Swedish and Italian Jewish populations, which
were equal. In this way Valentin was showing how Italian fascism could differ from German
fascism in terms of the Jewish question, since Italy did not have enough Jews to have to worry
about a Jewish question.109 By extension, of course, Valentin’s larger unstated message was that
since Sweden had a Jewish population proportionally similar to that of Italy, it had little cause to
be concerned about a “Jewish problem,” despite the troubling rise of various Fascist and Nazi
groups in Sweden. While Valentin’s work was definitely written with a bias towards Sweden, it
can still be inferred that up to the book’s publication in 1937 anti-Semitism had not been a major
factor in the everyday life of an average Swede. While there had been some emerging antiSemitic groups in Sweden, Valentin wrote the book so that Swedish readers could understand the
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foreign concept of anti-Semitism. The only real mention made of Sweden or the other
Scandinavian countries is in reference to Nazi racial science and the emphasis they placed upon
the Nordic race as carrying the essential characteristics of the Germanic race. Valentin
chronicled the racial thought of Hans F. Günther only to come to the conclusion, “Nowhere
outside the borders of Germany has the Nazi racial doctrine found acceptance, not even in the
countries whose population, in contradistinction to the German, is Nordic with relatively little
admixture, Scandinavia, Holland, England, where, according to Güther, “the genuine Teutons”
are to be found.”110 Of course, in his bias Valentin forgot to mention that Swedish racial science
pre-dated the Nazi racial science. However, Valentin is correct in pointing out that a majority of
Swedes, and in reality Scandinavians in general, enjoyed good relations with their Jewish fellow
citizens.111
Steven Koblik’s The Stones Cry Out was the first book written in English that addressed
the Holocaust in Sweden. While Koblik analyzed the positive Swedish actions of rescuing the
Danish Jews and the actions of Raoul Wallenberg, he also argued that though newspapers and
stories were circulating throughout Sweden during the Holocaust, the Swedish government
continued to deny and suppress the actual events of the Holocaust form their population. The
Swedish government, according to Koblik, suppressed talk of this tragedy because of the damage
such public discourse could have on its relationship with Germany. In fact, Koblik argued that
the evidence showed the Foreign Office of Sweden actively trying to suppress stories and
mention of the Holocaust within Sweden.112 This puts the Swedish response to the Holocaust in
perspective: while Sweden might have saved many Jews from extermination from Denmark or
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Wallenberg was saving tens of thousands in Hungary, the majority of Swedes were not actively
participating in rescuing the Jews. In fact, most of them did not even know what was happening
in Germany. As Koblik argued, “The government’s silence cannot in sum be explained because
of its desires to be more helpful with regard to the Jews. The real reason was fear of a negative
German response if Sweden became a center for anti-German “propaganda.” The government’s
policy not only stopped the Swedish public form fully comprehending the plight of the Jews, it
also contributed to a general international silence whose effects were probably helpful to the
success of the Final Solution.”113 This would become the standard interpretation of the Swedish
press in regards to the Holocaust; it was silent in order to maintain its ties with Germany. MariaPia Boëthius would also argue this point in her controversial book, Heder och Samvete. Sverige
Under Andra Världskriget. However, in Reporting the Holocaust in the British, Swedish and
Finnish Press, 1945-50, Andtero Holmila pointed out that this was not an accurate interpretation
of the Swedish press or the knowledge of the Swedish citizenry. Holmila argued that the
Swedish press kept the Swedish people well informed on what was happening to the Jews of
Europe under Hitler and that the censorship protocols the Swedish government passed were
hardly ever enforced. In fact, the Holocaust was covered in more detail in Sweden than in Great
Britain or even the United States.114
Koblik came to the conclusion that Sweden contributed to the Holocaust by remaining
silent throughout much of the war to the terror being perpetrated by Nazi Germany. Although,
Koblik recognized that after the rescue of the Danish Jews and the lack of a German response,
Sweden became much more interested in helping the Jews, Koblik maintained that Sweden could
have done more. Koblik also correctly pointed out that the initiative for the Danish rescue or
113
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Wallenberg’s activities in Hungary came from outside of the Swedish government, from the
Danes and Americans. Koblik argued that Swedish Prime Minister Hansson and Foreign
Minister Günther both wanted to gradually swing towards the Allies in order to avoid an
altercation with Germany.115 In this way they only took steps towards saving the Jews when the
Allies put pressure on them, so that there would be an excuse if Germany was to bring it up.
Koblik rightly argued that “If the Western Powers had placed a higher priority on Sweden
helping the Jews, there is much evidence to suggest that Sweden would have acted more
vigorously even in 1943…Should Sweden have depended upon their encouragement? When it
came to issues related to their Scandinavian brothers, there was little hesitancy to act.”116 This
would become the primary argument amongst Swedish historians and authors, should Sweden
have done more to save the Jews of Europe?
The second, and the only other major Anglo-American work on Sweden during the
Holocaust, was Paul A. Levine’s From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the
Holocaust, which came to some different conclusions than Koblik’s work. Levine argued that
once the Swedish government learned of the genocide being perpetrated by the Germans against
the Jews, the Swedes became more active in rescuing the Jews. The most striking difference
between Koblik’s and Levine’s arguments, though, centered on the question of if more could
have been done to save the Jews. Levine argued,
But for historians the question of more remains, however compelling, the wrong one.
On the contrary, what required asking is what was done, why, and by whom? This study
shows that when men working for Sweden’s government were confronted by certain
choices, certain decisions were made. Representatives of Sweden’s government, for a
variety of reasons, decided it was worth their time and effort to try to save Jews during
the war. That was their intent, and the available documentation leaves no question that
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they worked energetically to achieve this goal. Even a methodologically sound historian
can appraise that as a good thing to have happened.117
This refuted Koblik’s claim that the Swedes only helped the Jews at the insistence of the Allies.
In fact, when explaining why Sweden chose to help the Jews Levine pointed out that Swedish
government officials faced the same pressure from its population as the Allied countries faced,
yet only the Swedes chose to act to save as many Jews as they could.118 This is a point of view
that is missing from most of the academic works on Sweden during the Holocaust that are
available in English, the uniqueness of Sweden actually acting in order to save the Jews. As
Levine argued, “When Swedish diplomats understood the choices which lay before them, they
made the right choice. During the war, Swedish moral indifference evolved into a committed,
humanistic activism, and with this change lives were saved.”119 There are very few countries
that the same could be written for in regards to the Holocaust.
Emmy E. Werner has correctly pointed out in her 2002 book, A Conspiracy of Decency,
that the decision undertaken by the Swedish Government to bring in Jewish refugees from
Denmark signified a complete break from Sweden’s earlier policy of maintaining neutrality no
matter what the cost. For instance, on October 2, 1943, the Swedish Government offered asylum
to all Danish Jews and on October 3, 1943, the Swedish Government ordered that the Swedish
Navy was to keep all German ships out of Swedish waters. Had the German Navy pressed the
matter, the Swedes might very well have entered into the war against Hitler. Along with the
orders to keep out the German ships, the Swedish Government also ordered fuel to be made
available to all Swedish fishermen so that they could aid in the rescue of the Danish Jews. These
orders came just a few weeks after the Swedes had ordered a complete halt to German military
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transit through Sweden. The Swedish actions were in part a response to what the Swedes had
witnessed in the fall of 1942 in Norway, where the Nazis had implemented oppressive measures
against the Norwegian Jews.120 Werner’s book is the first to critically examine the actual people
involved in this story, both Jewish escapees and non-Jews who helped in the escape. This
approach makes sense, as Werner is a developmental psychologist and research professor at the
University of California. The book is an important contribution because it focuses on the people
and what drove them to the decision to help the Danish Jews.
John Gilmour’s 2010 book, Sweden, The Swastika, and Stalin, examined Sweden during
the Second World War. In the book, Gilmour wrote about Sweden during the Holocaust and
made the point that in February 1943, only eight months before the Swedish decision to save the
Danish Jews, the Swedes had rejected but then accepted a plan that would have sent 20,000
Jewish children to live in Sweden on the condition the Americans and British paid for their food.
Gilmour argued that this was not because the Swedes did not care about the fate of the Jews,
rather, the Swedes wanted to make the plan palatable to the Germans. The Swedes also were
undergoing talks at this time about taking in undernourished Norwegian children and repatriating
them into Swedish society.121 It becomes obvious that the Swedes were dismissing the plan
because they were realistic and did not want to take on too many refugees or open themselves up
to an invasion. The Nazis were still seen as the likely victor in the war at this point and it would
have been disastrous for the Swedes to adopt this policy. The Swedes took action once it became
possible for them to do so, October 1943.
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Baltic and Polish refugees were also a major issue for the Swedish government during the
Second World War. While there had been a steady stream of refugees from Norway, Finland,
and Germany throughout the war, towards the end of the war there was a surge in refugees from
the Baltic states and Poland. Included in these refugees were liberated concentration camp
survivors. There has been little written in English about these refugees, Lars Olsson’s On the
Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden being the only major work in English to focus on
these refugees. Olsson’s book, though, primarily deals with the assimilation of these refugees
into Swedish society and how the Swedes viewed the refugees stay in Sweden as temporary. 122
While Olsson’s book is biased towards a labor point of view, it still raises a critical question,
why did the Swedes take these refugees on? Olsson answered that they were brought in for two
reasons, to improve Sweden’s image with the Allies who were emerging victorious and because
Sweden needed labor for its capitalist society.123 While the argument that Sweden granted these
refugees temporary asylum in order to reap economic benefits from them could be argued
against, the reality is that the Swedes did take these refugees on in order to repair their tarnished
reputation amongst the Allied states.
An example of how the rescue of the Danish Jews has not been fairly represented in the
historiography of the Holocaust is Alex Kershaw’s 2010 book, The Envoy: The Epic Rescue of
the Last Jews of Europe. In the book, Kershaw examines the Holocaust and how it ended.
Kershaw goes into great detail about Raoul Wallenberg, which is deserved, but fails to
acknowledge the rescue of the Danish Jews. Kershaw noted, “Although most well-informed
people have heard of Wallenberg today, many, including Jews, know less about him than about
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Oscar Schindler, who saved far fewer people and in any case profited from their forced labor.”124
This is not meant to suggest that Wallenberg is not deserving of the credit he has been given. If
anything there needs to be more research done into his life and the effects he had on the
Holocaust. What is apparent, though, is that many academics have become bogged down when
looking into Sweden and focus only on Wallenberg and fail to fairly assess the rescue of the
Danish Jews. The rescue was not important just because it saved thousands of lives, it was
important because it was Sweden’s break from neutrality. In the span of a month the Swedes had
gone from accommodating Hitler to ordering its Navy to keep German ships out of its water.
One other aspect of the Holocaust that Sweden played a role in that has not received
enough attention amongst English-speaking historians is the role of racial science. Jonas
Hansson, a Swedish historian, has pointed out how race biology and science took a dominant
role in the early twentieth century. Swedish legislative action attempted to halt immigration and
introduced sterilization into Swedish society. Hansson discussed the various Swedish historians
who have tackled this problem but pointed out that much research needs to be done to adequately
assess how close the Swedish and German racial sciences were to one another.125 Another
historian, Piero Cola, has analyzed how Swedish racial science and the overall concept of the
Swedish community were directly responsible for the halt to immigration. Cola pointed out that
when the Swedish State Administration for Health allowed ten Jewish students expelled from
schools in Germany to come to Sweden and take up residency, it led to the largest xenophobic
backlash in Sweden’s history. Student societies and universities all came out in favor of banning
and blocking this type of behavior from the government because Swedish society viewed Jewish
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immigration as a threat to the racial community of Sweden. Cola argued that this backlash and
these feelings, while lacking the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, represented how the majority
of the population felt. Simply put, Sweden had adopted the idea of protecting its racial purity
despite the fact that Swedish racial science started out as hardly anti-Semitic, but by the 1930s,
there had been an adoption of anti-Semitic ideas that resulted in Sweden denying immigration to
German Jews.126 This, of course, is in stark contrast to Valentin’s assertion that anti-Semitism
was a foreign concept to the Swedes. This contradiction is further proof that there is more work
to be done on Sweden in regards to the Holocaust as, ironically, Swedish eugenics policies
would remain in effect, and Sweden continued to sterilize “unfit” women, until 1975.
The Swedes were allowed to get away with their involvement in hindering the Holocaust
because the iron ore trade was so vital to the German war economy that Hitler had to turn a blind
eye towards these events. It is not a coincidence that the Swedes began to save Jews after the
Germans lost at Stalingrad and were unable to regain the initiative in the east, the Swedes
understood not just that the Jews were being killed, as Levine has pointed out, the Swedes also
understood that they could get away with helping the Jews. A comparison between how the
Nazis treated Sweden and Hungary in regards to the Holocaust shows the importance of Swedish
iron ore to the Nazis. In March 1944, the Nazis invaded Hungary in part because the Hungarian
government would neither implement, nor deport, its Jewish citizens for the Final Solution.127
All the Hungarians had to offer the Germans, the last oil fields Germany could attain as well as a
buffer between the Soviet Union and Germany, could be taken relatively easy by force. Sweden
was able to escape the demands of the Final Solution because the Nazis could not, under any
circumstances, lose the iron ore that Sweden provided. This is how the two topics of this
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chapter, iron ore and the Holocaust, overlap. The importance of Sweden’s iron ore allowed
Sweden the opportunity to act with autonomy in regards to the Holocaust.
In conclusion, the Swedes followed policies that were designed to protect its neutrality
and save its population from the horrors they saw around them. The Nazis had invaded their
Western neighbor, Norway, and the Soviets were waging war with their Eastern neighbor,
Finland. It is understandable that Sweden would want to remain outside of this conflict. AngloAmerican Historians and academics have long admitted the importance of Swedish iron ore to
the German war effort, but as this chapter has shown, they have also largely failed to analyze the
problem. Anglo-American historians have been the worst offenders, as only a handful of books
and articles have actually addressed Sweden’s dilemma and the tangible effect Swedish iron ore
had on the German economy. Recently, there have been some attempts by English-speaking
historians at answering these questions in depth, Gilmour’s and Werner’s recent works being the
prime examples, but the dearth of material is still overwhelming. Further, Sweden’s role in the
Holocaust continues to be overshadowed by the actions of an individual Swede, Wallenberg, and
not the actions of the state. Sweden played a much larger role in the Second World War then
they have been given credit for, both in terms of supplying the Germans and saving thousands of
Jews.
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CHAPTER 4
NORWAY: INVADED AND OVERLOOKED
The Norwegian campaign of 1940 was the first occasion on which all three elements of
modern war—sea, land and air—were fully involved. This frequently quoted truism
makes its history basic reading for the study of the functions and organization of defence;
perhaps the most urgent problem which faces the strategist of today. For this reason
alone, the campaign has a more lasting importance than that of a small unsuccessful
episode of a war fought under conditions unlikely to be repeated.128
J.L. Moulton was quite correct in his analysis of the German invasion of Norway, as it
was the first time in military history that sea, land, and air were fully involved and fully
coordinated. This campaign was instructive to both the German Military and the Allied Military;
yet, the importance that Moulton attached to this campaign has been lost to modern scholars.
Rarely has an academic work focused on this campaign, especially amongst English-speaking
academics. Once again, the overwhelming majority of scholars have focused on the Eastern
Front or Anglo-American actions that proved more successful. While these topics are important
to the scholarship of the war, they alone do not represent the whole story of World War II.
Though the Norwegian campaign has garnered more attention than the Finnish or Swedish
stories from World War II amongst English-speaking historians and academics, it is still severely
under covered. While Moulton might have been right in his analysis of the invasion, his analysis
on its lasting importance has proven false.
Halvdan Koht was the Foreign Minister for the Norwegian Government leading up to the
German invasion of Norway. After the invasion Koht immediately wrote a book on the invasion
of Norway, 1941’s Norway: Neutral and Invaded, which sought to make the struggle Norway
was facing more known to the rest of the world. In the book, Koht argued that Norway had the
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unique position of having known nearly continuous peace since 1720; with the exception of the
Napoleonic Wars and a brief three-week war in 1788. Koht summarized this phenomenon:
“Thus the peace traditions of the Norwegian people were extraordinarily deep-rooted. They
thought of peace as the natural condition of nations, and they had no longing for military
honours. People who imagine that warfare is needed to keep a nation brave and proud and
prevent it from degeneration, may take the Norwegian example as a refutation of such
theories.”129 This was the state of Norway leading up to German invasion, a nation that not only
had known peace for over two centuries but had come to believe that peace was the natural order
of things for the nation.
Indeed, following the First World War there developed in Norway a discomfort with the
League of Nations and the idea of collective security. Norway became disillusioned with the
League of Nations as an entity that could actually pacify a conflict and chose to focus on national
or regional (Scandinavian) defense. This was in large part due to the other demands on the
national economy that were primarily a consequence of the growing social welfare state. Many
Norwegians found it easy to compromise on defense spending because they believed neutrality
would work again and they saw the money could be used better elsewhere.130 Koht pointed out
that it had been the League’s failure in dealing with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia that had
moved the Norwegians to join their Scandinavian brethren, Spain, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland in telling the League on July 1, 1936, that they would no longer be moved to follow
collective security and would begin acting on an individual basis because of the League’s
inconsistencies and failures.131 As Hitler began moving pieces on the European checkerboard,
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the Norwegians continued to pursue neutrality and the autonomy of choice towards military
action. As the rest of Europe began silently preparing for war, Norway was attempting to escape
that conflict by cutting its ties to collective security and Europe.
Henrik O. Lunde has pointed out that in September 1939, as the war began, neither the
Allies nor Germany planned for the conflict to entangle Norway or the rest of Scandinavia. In
fact, Germany wanted Norway to remain neutral and met Norway’s September 2, 1939,
declaration of neutrality with immediate satisfaction.132 Earl Ziemke noted that during the first
week of the war, German Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell was sent to all of the Scandinavian
capitals in order to give reassurances that Germany would respect their independence while
warning these governments not to restrict their trade with Germany.133 Von Hassell’s trip is
symbolic of Norway’s involvement with the Second World War because the issue of trade would
dominate Norway’s wartime experience. It was vital to the Germans, as this work’s second
chapter showed, for Germany to maintain its iron ore trade with Sweden and Norway was a
major shipping route for that iron ore during the winter months when iron ore could not be
shipped through Sweden. While Lunde might have been quite correct in arguing that in
September 1939 neither belligerent was interested in Scandinavia, it would not take either
belligerent long to become interested in Norway and the rest of Scandinavia.
As early as September 19, 1939, only sixteen days after the Allies declared war on
Germany, the British began discussing what to do about Germany receiving Swedish iron ore
shipped from the Norwegian port of Narvik during the winter months. Winston Churchill noted
in his six-volume history of the war that on September 19th he had brought up to the British War
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Cabinet the idea of mining the Norwegian waters before the winter iron ore trade began. This
would have forced any ship that was trading iron ore to the Germans to have to leave Norwegian
territorial waters and enter the open sea where the Royal Navy could confiscate the iron ore.
Churchill noted that the Cabinet was open to the idea but no decision was reached on that day.
In fact, on September 29, 1939, Churchill would again bring up the issue of Narvik, only to have
the British War Cabinet ignore it once again. As Churchill wrote, “The Foreign Office
arguments about neutrality were weighty, and I could not prevail. I continued, as will be seen, to
press my point by every means and on all occasions. It was not, however, until April, 1940, that
the decision that I asked for in September, 1939, was taken. By that time it was too late.”134 The
British, particularly Churchill, were interested in cutting off the German access to Swedish iron
ore, if not permanently then at least for the winter months. In the early stage of the war, though,
the British could not even agree if mining the Norwegian waters should even be attempted. The
end result of the British deliberations was a growing suspicion amongst German military leaders
about the role the British wanted to play in Scandinavia.
To the Allied powers, the Winter War provided a unique opportunity to help out the
democratic Finland while also occupying the iron ore fields of Sweden and shutting down trade
through Narvik. Churchill noted, “If Narvik was to become a kind of Allied base to supply the
Finns, it would certainly be easy to prevent the German ships loading ore at the port and sailing
safely down the Leads to Germany.”135 To the British, then, the importance of both Norway and
Finland was tied directly to the ability to halt the German acquisition of Swedish iron ore. The
Allied plan to mine the territorial waters of Norway was not being discussed as a way to protect
the sovereignty and neutrality of Norway; it was being discussed because it presented the
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opportunity to help the British war effort. The same can be said for Finland, although there was
much outcry against the Soviet invasion of the small, democratic state. The Allies looked to
Scandinavia not as a neutral area, but rather as an area that could be used to the advantage of the
Allied cause by cutting off German access to Swedish iron ore through the occupation of Narvik
and the Swedish fields themselves. British historian Sir Llewellyn Woodward argued that the
Winter War provided the Allies the opportunity to enter Scandinavia under the pretext of helping
the Finns, which had been authorized by the League of Nations, thus making the action not a
violation of Norwegian or Swedish neutrality. In fact, it was not until the Winter War that
landing troops in Scandinavia had even been contemplated.136
The British Foreign Office had come to agree with Churchill’s December 16, 1939,
argument that the British could not fight the war while allowing the Germans to break
international law while the British followed international law, though how the Germans were
breaking international law was never made clear. The Foreign Office decided that if the British
actions were not inhumane, the British could begin considering a policy in regards to the Narvik
ore traffic. The British, though, did not see much point in halting the Narvik traffic because the
infringement of Norwegian territorial waters would not involve any major achievement for the
British, since the Germans would just regain the iron ore once the Baltic was free of ice. To
achieve any real success, the Baltic traffic would have to be cut as well, which meant seizing the
Swedish iron ore mines themselves.137 The opportunity to leave troops in Sweden while sending
help to Finland during the Winter War provided the Allied Cause the incentive to begin planning
for the occupation of the Swedish iron ore mines.
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From the German perspective, Scandinavia was quickly becoming an area that would not
be able to maintain its neutrality. In his memoirs, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel wrote,
Discussions had been taking place since October 1939 with the Navy on the vital
importance of Norway as a naval and air base for the further conduct of the war, should
the British manage to get a foot-hold there: they would be in a position to dominate the
Bay of Heligoland and the exit channels for our fleet and submarine forces as well as
confronting our naval ports and the passage from the Baltic out into the Atlantic with a
serious threat from their Air Force.138
German planning, then, pre-dated the start of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet
Union. In fact, the German Navy had been arguing the importance of the Norwegian coast as a
naval base as far back as Vice-Admiral Wolfgang Wegener’s 1926 treatise The Naval Strategy of
the World War. Wegener’s thesis was that during the First World War the German navy should
not have been content to wage a defensive war from the protection of the North Sea, but rather,
should have expanded to the Skagerrak. This would have allowed the Germans to control the
shipping routes of Norway, which would have benefited Germany and harmed the British.
Controlling a naval line further from the coast of Germany would have helped the German war
effort because controlling shipping routes is the real strength of a navy.139 Wegener’s ideas
would form the crux of German naval strategy during the 1930s, especially influencing Admiral
Raeder, who would become the next champion of the Norwegian strategy.
Admiral Raeder’s biographer has pointed out that during October 1939 Raeder himself
was taking a prominent role in the discussion of German action in Norway. On October 10,
1939, Raeder suggested to Hitler that bases along the Norwegian coast would be a value to the
U-boat war and more importantly in protecting German shipments of Swedish iron ore. His
biographer, Keith Bird, argued that Admiral Raeder was primarily motivated by the desire to
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ensure that the German Navy’s share of economic resources did not diminish during the war.140
Either way, though, the real importance of Raeder’s conversation with Hitler is not whether it
was done in order to protect the German Navy or in order to attain these valuable bases; rather,
the importance is the German Navy was discussing occupying Norway with Hitler almost two
months before Stalin launched the Winter War against Finland. So while it has been argued by
both Ziemke and Lunde that neither the Germans nor the Allies had plans for Scandinavia when
the war began, it did not take either side very long to come up with plans for the involvement of
Scandinavia. Churchill had begun planning for the elimination of Swedish iron ore by
September 19, 1939, and Erich Raeder had begun planning for the occupation of Norway by
October 10, 1939; the war had only begun on September 1, 1939.
The German planning for an invasion of Norway is not mentioned in Army Chief of Staff
Halder’s wartime diary until December 14, 1939, nearly two months after Raeder’s conversation
with Hitler. More important, though, December 14 was only a few weeks after the Winter War
had begun. Halder’s diary, written in shorthand, only mentions that the issue of a preventative
war was discussed, without providing much detail except that the operation would be a combined
operation between the Navy and the Army and that it would be undertaken simultaneously with
an invasion of Denmark.141 Churchill argued that this signified the German decision to invade
Norway, claiming that “Quisling and his assistant, Hagelin, came to Berlin on December 14, and
were taken by Raeder to Hitler, to discuss a political stroke in Norway. Quisling arrived with a
detailed plan. Hitler, careful of secrecy, affected reluctance to increase his commitments, and
said he would prefer a neutral Scandinavia. Nevertheless, according to Raeder, it was on this
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very day that he gave the order to the Supreme Command to prepare for a Norwegian
operation.”142 Henrik Lunde has correctly pointed out, though, that this is entirely misleading.
Lunde argued, “Hitler only directed OKW to investigate how to take control of the country.
Churchill’s statement makes it appear that the Germans decided to invade Norway before they
actually did.”143
Vidkun Quisling, who Hitler met with on December 14, 1939, was a Norwegian
politician of little notoriety at the time. Quisling had served as Defense Minister during Peder
Kolstad’s and Jens Hundseid’s governments from 1931 to 1933 after which time Quisling began
forming his own National Socialist Party modeled on the Nazi example. Quisling would spend
the rest of the 1930s leading the far-right in Norway, albeit to limited success. When the war
broke out, Quisling decided to take advantage of the situation and sought Nazi Germany’s help
in taking control in Norway, hence the December 14 meeting. As Quisling’s biographer, Ralph
Hewins, pointed out, “During the last quarter of a century a network of Norwegian, British,
German and Russian vested interests has blackened Quisling’s name with almost every
imaginable crime from murder and theft to high treason, until his character and career have
become completely distorted in history and in the popular imagination at home and abroad.”144
Hewins made that argument in 1966; the forty-five plus years that have passed since then have
only further muddled the debate about what role Quisling played and how he should be viewed.
Hewins eventually arrived at the conclusion that Quisling was not the treasonous usurper
that most historians have made him out to be. In fact, Hewins believed that had Quisling not
fallen in league with Rosenberg, one of the chief Nazi racial theorists, Quisling would have
escaped the war without much damage to his character. The Quisling that Hewins presented was
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a Quisling who wanted to protect Norway from becoming a Protectorate, the fate of Poland,
Bohemia, and Holland, and the only way this could be prevented would be if Quisling led the
country.145 This view of Quisling, a flawed man trying to save his country, definitely stands out
amongst the various works that have been written about Quisling, but that does not make it
correct. Another of Quisling’s biographers, Paul Hayes, argued,
Being this kind of person, an intelligent dreamer, devoid of political qualities such as
perception and the ability to compromise, how did Quisling become famous as a man of
action? The fact is that the world made its judgement on him in April 1940, and has not
changed that judgement since. Major Quisling, like Judge Lynch and Captain Boycott,
has been immortalised by giving his name to a word in the English language. Yet how
strange is the decree of history! Whatever Quisling may have been, he was certainly not
the most obvious candidate for that dubious honour. He was muddled rather than
thoroughly corrupted. He loved Norway but he disagreed with the majority of his fellow
countrymen on how best to protect his native land from dangers threatening it in the
1930s…How ironical that it is Quisling who is remembered above all as the archetypal
traitor!146
Hayes reiterated the idea that Quisling was not a traitor, instead he was just a man who has been
unfairly judged by history. These two revisionist biographies were attempting to change the way
that Quisling was viewed amongst historians by insinuating that he was not a traitor but he
simply backed the wrong horse in his attempt to protect Norway from complete occupation by
the Nazis.
The principal reason that Quisling is important for this thesis is the fact that his very
name has created an atmosphere around the Norwegian campaign that suggests Norway was lost
only because of his treachery. This has allowed the Norwegians, British, and French an easy
explanation for two difficult questions, first why Norway was lost to the Germans and second
why Germany was even interested in Norway. As the rest of this thesis will show, Norway was
not invaded, nor did it fall, because of the actions of Vidkun Quisling. Norway was invaded
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because of Allied actions, particularly the plans for the occupation of the Swedish iron ore fields
and the port of Narvik, as well as the Altmark incident. These were the real reasons that
Germany invaded Norway, and their fault lies in the Allied hands. Norway did not fall because
Quisling gave intelligence to the Nazis or how he maneuvered himself into power; rather, it fell
because the Allies pulled out of Norway in order to halt the German advance through France.
This inconvenient truth has led English speaking authors, particularly the British, to overstate the
importance of Vidkun Quisling. Hewins and Hayes, then, were actually right in their analysis of
Quisling.
Lunde pointed out some of the major reasons why Quisling had no direct impact upon the
German planning of the invasion of Norway. Lunde first noted that, “There is no evidence to
suggest that the information received from Quisling had any major effect on German
preparations, or that Quisling had any knowledge about German plans. Claims by some British
authors…that Quisling provided the Germans with detailed information…are not supported by
the subsequent developments or by information in German sources.”147 How, then, was Quisling
a traitor who caused the invasion of Norway? The reality is that there is no documentation to
support the thesis that Quisling helped plan the invasion. Lunde further shattered this longstanding notion by pointing out “The fact that German intelligence was wrong on several issues
well known to Quisling and his followers suggests that they provided little or no information of
military value.”148 One of the examples that Lunde cites to show this was General von
Falkenhorst’s directive for the attack on Narvik. The directive for the attack called on the 139th
Mountain Regiment to capture Narvik, the army depot at Elvegårdsmoen, and the fortifications
that were believed to exist on both sides of Ofortfjord near Ramsund, but in reality did not.

147
148

Lunde, 56.
Lunde, 56.

73

Some historians have argued that Quisling gave the Germans the information on these shore
batteries. However, as Lunde pointed out, Quisling would have known that there were not any
shore batteries here and would not have informed the Germans that there were.149
The major reason Hitler and the Nazis became involved in Norway was the iron ore
traffic. As Churchill pointed out, the Winter War brought an Allied strategy to both help the
Finns and cut off a vital resource the Germans needed for their war economy, iron ore. As Geirr
Haarr has noted, the Germans were not interested in promoting Quisling to power; for instance,
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was disturbed that Hitler had even met with Quisling and the
German minister in Oslo Curt Bräuer made it immediately known to top level Nazis that
Quisling held no significant leverage in Norway. ‘Studie Nord,’ the initial plan for the invasion
of Norway, was strictly hypothetical when it was commissioned in the second week of January
1940. ‘Studie Nord’ came to the conclusion that a neutral Norway without a major British
influence was to the German advantage but also recommended that pre-emptive plans for an
invasion of Norway should be drawn up. It was not until January 27, 1940, that Hitler instructed
the OKW to develop these plans under the special Sonderstab Weserübung.150 Halder even
wrote on January 1, 1940, that Quisling had no followers and “It is in our interest to keep
Norway neutral. In case England threatened Norway’s neutrality, our policy will change.” 151
Halder’s contemporary observation hit at the key point, that it was not Quisling, but rather
British actions, which drove German decision-making in regards to Norway. Even after the
meetings between Hitler and Quisling, Hitler continued to hold to the idea that a neutral Norway
would be the most beneficial to Germany. Once it became obvious during the Winter War that
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the Allies were developing plans to send troops into Scandinavia the Germans began drawing up
plans, not as a result of Quisling’s visit. In fact, once Hitler had approved of the plans for the
invasion of Norway on February 29, 1940, Hitler stressed to Rosenberg that there was to be no
attempt to attain Quisling’s support in any way.152
Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz also argued that the planning for action in Norway was not a
result of Quisling’s visit. In his memoirs, Doenitz wrote, “There were indications that the enemy
also was planning military operations against Norway. It was these indications which finally led
to the decision to forestall [the enemy] by means of a counter-stroke…It was in the light of this
situation and within the framework of the general plan that we at U-boat Command were to take
action. All preparations were to be completed by March 10…”153 This passage was in reference
to the March 5, 1940, decision to invade Norway and Denmark but is relevant to this discussion
because it shows how the Allied actions were driving German strategy. Doenitz did not write
that operations had been ordered because Hitler believed the Norwegian and Danes would rally
around Quisling and the Nazi cause, he wrote that the operations were being planned as a
response to what German intelligence knew about French and British operational plans. The
Allied plans were for the occupation of the Swedish iron ore fields and the port of Narvik, this is
what pushed the Germans into action.
What, though, pushed the Germans from the findings of ‘Studie Nord,’ that a neutral
Norway was best for Germany to the March 5 decision to invade? The answer to that question is
the Altmark incident. The Altmark was a German tanker that had been acting as a supply vessel
to the pocket-battleship Admiral Graf Spee. The Graf Spee had sunk at least nine British
merchant ships, though the men aboard the ships had been taken prisoner before the British ships
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had been sunk. Of these prisoners, 299 would end up on the Altmark. The British eventually
drove the Graf Spee into Montevideo where the Brtish prisoners were released and rescued. The
British, then, knew that the Altmark contained prisoners when it was stopped in Norwegian
territorial waters near Trondheim on February 14, 1940, by a Norwegian torpedo boat. The
Norwegians let the boat continue until it was stopped a second and a third time by Norwegian
torpedo boats. Eventually, the Royal Navy’s 4th Destroyer Flotilla caught wind of the Altmark’s
position and moved in. After finding the ship the British surrounded it but the Altmark was able
to evade the British ships, thanks to some help from the Norwegian Navy’s attempts to preserve
neutrality.154 On the evening of February 16, 1940, the Altmark was forced into Joessing Fjord
by the Cossack, a British destroyer, and the prisoners were freed. Controversy arose
immediately because the British actions were in clear violation of the laws of neutrality, since
they had initiated combat in territorial waters without any regard for Norway’s neutrality. Edwin
Borchard, an American legal scholar, had even argued in April 1940 that the Germans had not
violated Norway’s neutrality by sailing through the waters, but the British had violated
Norwegian neutrality by forcing the issue.155 The historical significance of this event, though,
has often been neglected by English-speaking historians. Many still try to regard this incident as
secondary to Quisling’s meetings with Hitler as the major driving force in the decision to invade
Norway.
As one British historian has argued, “On the whole, it appears that Hitler himself
regarded the occupation of Norway primarily as a preventative measure and that, although
instructions to make a plan date from Hitler’s first meeting with Quisling on 14th December, the
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effective decision to implement it resulted from the Altmark episode of 16th February, which
showed that…Britain was ready to infringe Norwegian neutrality.”156 Derry, then, was one of
the few British historians to correctly point out why the Germans chose to invade Norway.
Derry’s interpretation, of course, suffers from the same mistake as Churchill’s overall
interpretation of the Norwegian Campaign, that the December 14th meeting with Quisling had
made the invasion of Norway inevitable. Derry, at least, understood the significance of the
Altmark Incident for the actual invasion of Norway. For instance, Churchill’s opinion of the
significance of the Altmark appears to be the prestige the rescue of the British prisoners gave him
and the Navy.157 Churchill actually argued, “Hitler’s decision to invade Norway had, as we have
seen, been taken on December 14, and the staff work was proceeding under Keitel. The incident
of the Altmark no doubt gave a spur to action.”158 In this way Churchill was continuing the trend
he had established previously in The Gathering Storm of shifting the blame for the decision to
invade Norway onto Quisling and Hitler. Churchill reiterates that the decision to invade had
been made following the December 14 meeting between Quisling and Hitler and then glosses
over the Altmark Incident as if the only significance of that episode was that he had rescued a
few hundred British soldiers held on board that ship. Churchill fails to mention that it was the
British decision to overlook Norwegian neutrality by boarding a German boat in Norwegian
territory that made the Germans decide to launch the invasion.
William Shirer, the American journalist who lived through the Nazi years in Germany,
argued that January 27, 1940, marked the end of Hitler’s hesitations about an invasion of
Norway. On this day, Hitler had Keitel issue a directive that shifted all work on ‘Studie Nord’ to
be continued under the direct supervision of Hitler. Hitler also ordered Keitel to take charge of
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the operation that would now be known as Weserübung. However, Keitel also argued that the
Altmark Incident was “For Hitler…the last straw. It convinced him that the Norwegians would
not seriously oppose a British display of force in their own territorial waters.”159 Once again,
there is an attempt to downplay the significance of the Altmark, as Shirer attempts to argue that
January 27 was the real day that the decision had been made that an invasion was going to occur
and the Altmark was just the event the was the last straw. Shirer, though, does not base the
argument that January 27th was a remarkable day upon any tangible proof. He offered no
explanation why that decision, to shift to Weserübung represented a concrete shift in Hitler’s
mind that it was no longer in Germany’s interest for Norway to remain neutral. As Haarr argued,
Weserübung was just a preventative strategy, and it was the Altmark Incident that turned these
plans from hypothetical to imminent.
The German invasion of Norway and Denmark depended upon surprise, as the German
navy could not hope to achieve success against the superior Allied naval forces any other way.
Seven divisions were set aside for the invasion, six for Norway and one for Denmark. Three
divisions would attack and four would be used in the follow-up to the invasion. Around eight
hundred operational aircraft and between two and three hundred transport planes were to be used
in the seaborne landings as well. The German plan was to surprise both the Allies and
Norwegians with their landing in order to prepare for defense against the Allied naval forces. It
was believed that the Germans could defend their position against the Allies by capturing
Norwegian airports and using the Luftwaffe as a tool against the Allied navy. To German
military leaders the greatest danger lay in bringing home the ships after dropping off the
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troops.160 General von Falkenhorst was a surprise choice to lead the invasion due to his
aristocratic origins. Indeed, on February 20, 1940, von Falkenhorst had been summoned to a
meeting with Hitler to go over von Falkenhorst’s experience in landing German troops in Finland
during Finland’s Civil War in 1918, not to name him commander of Weserübung. As François
Kersaudy has argued, though, “perhaps because he got carried away by his diatribe, and more
likely because he ‘sensed’ that he had found the right man, Hitler entrusted von Falkenhorst on
the spot with the command of Operation Weserübung.”161
In 1943 the Royal Norwegian Government Information Office published a short book
about the German invasion of Norway. According to the document, within twelve hours the
Germans had taken Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim,
Narvik, and all of the airfields. In the next few days all of the railway connections with Sweden
were taken.162 The British response to the German invasion was quite astounding. The British
Royal Navy battered the German Navy off of the coast of Narvik on April 13 so badly it led
historian Tom Shachtman to quip “…after the battle nothing German moved in Narvik
waters.”163 The success of the battle was not the most surprising, what stands out about April 13,
1940, is that the British did not follow up this victory with an attack on the German troops
stationed along the coast. General Eduard Dietl, who was in command of the troops in Narvik,
believed the British could have finished his forces off that afternoon and could not believe when
the British ships left the Narvik waters. Indeed, Hitler himself believed the campaign was over
and drafted up an order that would have forced General Deitl to move his troops from Narvik

160

Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway: April-June 1940 ed. David Brown (London & Portland,
Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), 5.
161
François Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 46.
162
Herman K. Lehmkuhl, Hitler Attacks Norway (London: The Royal Norwegian Government Information
Office, 1943), 19.
163
Tom Shachtman, The Phoney War: 1939-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982), 175.

79

and fight their way down to Trondheim, thus forsaking Narvik, the main objective point of the
Norwegian invasion. If not for Hitler’s staff purposefully holding the order up so that Hitler’s
mind could be changed, the order would have been given.164 April 13, 1940, could have been a
transformative day in the history of Europe, it could have become the day Norway was saved and
Germany lost her iron ore supplies and the ability to wage war. However, the thirteenth of April
ended like so many other days in Norway would end, with the British refusing to snatch victory
from Germany.
As for the British strategy for landing operation in Norway, Churchill argued in The
Gathering Storm:
Trondheim, if it were within our strength, was of course the key to any considerable
operations in Central Norway. To gain it meant a safe harbor with quays and docks upon
which an army of fifty thousand men or more could be built up and based. Near-by was
an airfield from which several fighter squadrons could work. The possession of
Trondheim would open direct railway contact with Sweden, and greatly improve the
chances of Swedish intervention or the degree of mutual aid possible if Sweden herself
attacked. From Trondheim alone the northward advance of the German invasion from
Oslo could be securely barred…Narvik, far away to the north, could be stormed or
reduced at leisure and would all the while be protected.165
Involving Sweden into the conflict would greatly improve the strategic aim of the British, since
it would have given them a second chance at cutting off iron ore from the Germans. Indeed,
cutting off the German ability to advance north would allow the British to continue holding them
at bay off the coast of Narvik; which would cut off iron ore traffic from that area. On April 14,
1940, the British landed 350 seamen and marines from the cruisers Glasgow and Sheffield onto
the shores of Namsos a city to the north of Trondheim. These landings were undertaken in order
to forestall a German landing at Namsos, but the news from the landed troops was far from
encouraging. Poor weather and facilities dominated the reporting from this landing, with the
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main idea stressed being that a large battalion would have difficulty advancing anywhere from
Namsos. The British had also devised for a landing in Åndalsnes, a city to the south of
Trondheim. While many in the British Cabinet showed hesitations about landing troops in the
Trondheim Fjord, Churchill continued to stress that an attack on Trondheim would be the best
strategy. Churchill considered the Namsos and Åndalsnes landings merely a diversion to
confuse the Germans, while the main thrust would be against Trondheim itself. Indeed, April 22
or 23 was seen as the probable timetable for the invasion of Trondheim, but at noon on April 20,
the British Chiefs of Staff cancelled the attack that Churchill had planned in favor of reinforcing
the British troops in Namsos and Åndalsnes and enveloping Trondheim in a pincer movement.
Trondheim, then, remained the strategic aim of the attack, but the British Chiefs of Staff saw no
reason to risk the Home Fleet against the German Luftwaffe, which was achieving some success
against British ships docked near the Trondheim Fjord.166
General Sir Edmund Ironside wrote on April 20, 1940, of the decision to avoid a direct
landing at Trondheim in favor of a pincer movement, “The new situation brought about by the
giving up of the main attack on Trondheim means a great deal more weight upon the two little
ports of Namsos and Andalsnes. Weight which we never expected would come there. Now we
must mount all the paraphernalia of a Base port to see that it [the force] doesn’t fall down in
front…I believe as a basis of thought that we ought to be able to take the place inside a
month.”167 This statement can be taken as both optimistic, that Ironside believed that the pincer
movement would eventually be successful against the Germans in Trodheim, and pessimistic,
since he also believed the forces in Namsos and Åndalsnes were not adequately equipped. Either
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way, Ironside’s musings left out one crucial element of the British plan for Trondheim, no one
had told the men in Namsos or Åndalsnes that the direct naval landings in Trondheim had been
cancelled. Further complicating matters was the German advance north towards Trondheim
from Oslo, which was increasingly becoming more and more successful.168 The situation, then,
was that a last minute change of plans had been made that the landed British troops were not
even made aware of, while the Germans steadily increased their position in the southern-center
sections of Norway. It would appear that General Ironside was being too optimistic in his
prediction of taking Trondheim within a month.
Lunde argued that the abandonment of a direct operation against Trondheim doomed the
Allied effort in central and southern Norway to failure because the rationale of having troops
move in from Namsos and Åndalsnes was to draw German troops out of Trondheim, thereby
making it easier for an Allied landing to take the city. Further, the snowy conditions made it
unlikely that a pincer movement would succeed because it was virtually impossible to cover the
long trek to Trondheim.169 Indeed, Derry noted that Lieutenant-General H.R.S. Massy was
appointed to command all Allied troops in Norway except those in Narvik, but the new General
and his headquarters never left London due to the speed that things turned badly for the Allies in
central and southern Norway. By the end of April, the decision had been made to withdraw
troops from central Norway due to the reality that the Germans had fortified their position in
Trondheim.170
As May 12 passed into May 13, the British, under General Mackesy, landed their first
troops into the Narvik area. General Auchinleck took control of the troops in northern Norway
with instructions to cut off the iron ore supplies and hold Narvik for the Norwegian King and his
168

Kersaudy, Norway 1940, 140-141.
Lunde, The Pre-emptive War, 318-319.
170
Derry, The Campaign in Norway, 78-82.
169

82

government. The assault on Narvik would not begin until May 27, 1940, though, well after
Hitler’s invasion of the west had begun. In fact, according to Churchill the decision to
concentrate all Allied strength in France had been made on May 24, 1940. The British had taken
Narvik by May 28, 1940, along with four hundred German prisoners. Churchill lamented this
fact in his memoirs, arguing, “We now had to relinquish all that we had won after such painful
exertions.”171 It is ironic that the very same moment the British were struggling to get as many
men off the shores of Dunkirk as they could; they had finally achieved their goals in Norway, the
occupation of Narvik.
A military withdrawal from Narvik by the British, in all reality, made sense. France was
likely to fall and it did not take too long to figure out that Hitler would next turn his attention to
crushing the British. From a strategic standpoint, then, withdrawing troops in order to have them
available for the defense of Great Britain was more than justifiable. What was unjustifiable,
though, is how the British handled the decision to evacuate Narvik. The British, according to
Derry, worked out the evacuation in total secret from the Norwegians. “Our naval resources
being stretched to the uttermost, the paramount need was to exploit the capture of Narvik in such
a way that the Germans might have no inkling of our intentions to withdraw until the main
convoys were well on their way home.”172 The Norwegians, then, genuinely believed that
Narvik was to be held as a last vestige of free Norway, and they had no idea that the Allies were
using the victory in order to pull out of the country. Derry justified this behavior by noting that
there had been some leaked information, including information that had postponed the final
assault on Norway, and the fear of what the Norwegians would think led to the decision to keep
the Norwegians in the dark about the decision. It was not until June 1, 1940, only a week before
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the withdrawal that the Norwegians were informed of the Allied decision.173 After the Allied
withdrawal, Narvik was retaken by the Germans and an armistice was signed between Norway
and Germany.
Churchill, of course, painted the picture so that the failure of the Norwegian campaign
had been due to the realities of the German advance west. However, Lunde has pointed out that
part of the problem in Norway was the way in which the Allies acted towards their Norwegian
partners. The British commanders, Mackesy and Auchinleck, never felt it important to visit and
discuss plans with the Norwegian military commanders, General Fleischer and General Ruge.
Further, as Lunde argued, by not letting the Norwegian commanders know of the planned
withdrawals from central and southern Norway, the Norwegians lost many men who were taken
prisoner, because they had no idea they were being left to fend for themselves. The Norwegian
advocacy for the strike on Trondheim and the use of the British navy, which was just sitting in
the bay of Narvik, went unheeded. Lunde noted, “The campaign in Norway is a textbook
example of what to avoid when multi-national forces are involved in joint operations…The
Allies were involved in the beginnings of a giant struggle that had worldwide implications while
the Norwegian leadership was more concerned about what happened in Norway.”174 The result
of the failure of the Norwegian campaign, then, can be argued to have been the Allied dismissal
of the Norwegians and their ideas. While this was not the sole reason for the Allied defeat, the
German advance into France was indeed unstoppable, an assault on Trondheim would have at
least been the correct strategy.
How should the campaign in Norway be viewed? Both the German and British initiatives
into the country had started out so well for both countries, yet the Germans won out in the end
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despite being defeated in the pivotal battle. Churchill chose to look at the bright side of the
failures of Norway, ending his analysis by arguing that the Norwegian campaign had effectively
eliminated the threat of the German navy in the coming Battle of Britain.175 This was indeed an
important accomplishment, but does it vindicate the British for the ineptitude of the campaign as
a whole? Did the Norwegian people fight and die for their freedom so that the British could have
an easier time in defending London? The real significance of the Norwegian campaign is the
fact that the Germans now had control of Scandinavia and all of the Swedish iron ore and
Finnish nickel it needed to build new ships, airplanes, rifles, and ammunition. Anglo-American
historians have always looked to the Scandinavian theater as of secondary importance, but the
reality is that this area could have been denied to the German war machine. The British had
captured Narvik, which had been the goal of the entire Allied plans for Scandinavia since
Churchill had first argued for involvement in Scandinavia on September 19, 1939. To achieve
that goal and just a little over a week later withdraw from that port was nearly unfathomable.
Further, one question that remains to be answered is, how could defending Narvik have
harmed the British defense during the Battle of Britain? The Battle of Britain was an aerial
battle that required very little in terms of ground troops, so the troops stationed in Narvik would
not have been a huge loss to the British defense. Yet, no English-speaking historian has asked
why Narvik had to be evacuated to protect Great Britain. Further, continued operations in
Narvik would have tied up several Luftwaffe squadrons that were actually used during the blitz,
which would at least have mitigated the damage from leaving troops in Narvik. It appears that
most English-speaking historians are eager to push the blame for the failures in Norway off onto
Quisling and the fall of France without ever questioning if operations in Norway needed to have
even failed. Moulton’s quote from the beginning of this chapter argued that the German invasion
175
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was the first to fully use planes, ships, and ground troops in an invasion, yet by the end of May
1940 the Allies had taken Narvik and destroyed the German navy. How truly effective were the
Germans in Norway, then? The war would have turned out very differently if the Germans had
lost Scandinavia, as the Allies would have been able to keep the Nazis on the defensive in
Sweden and Operation ‘Barbarossa’ would likely have been postponed. For these reasons, more
investigation into the Norwegian theater is more than worthy of Anglo-American historians
attention.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The Second World War is one of the most discussed events in human history amongst
Anglo-American historians, yet as this thesis has shown there are still gaps in the historical
literature, at least by Anglo-American historians. Our understanding of the war can only
advance as our knowledge and understanding of the interaction of the various fronts advance. It
is not just enough to know that Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, since the context of that
invasion must be understood in order for historians to fully comprehend why Hitler made that
decision. Nor is it enough to know that Norway was invaded in April 1940; again, understanding
needs to be reached of why Hitler felt it was vital to use troops in this area so close to the start of
the Western offensive. Anglo-American historians cannot continue to gloss over Scandinavia if
the war is to ever be fully understood amongst English-speaking scholars. This region deserves
more attention than the few pages that scholars have been willing to devote towards it, because
as this thesis has shown when Anglo-American authors or non-English speaking historians have
written extensively about Scandinavia during the Second World War, a plethora of information
that is usually omitted becomes apparent.
In the first chapter of this thesis, the importance of Finland was analyzed, specifically
how Finland contributed to the German decision to invade the Soviet Union. During the Winter
War, the Allies became obsessed with using this conflict as an excuse to send Allied troops into
Scandinavia to achieve the goal of cutting off the German supply of Swedish iron ore. Troops
would disembark in Narvik and then occupy the northern parts of Sweden where the iron ore was
mined; the remaining troops would enter Finland in order to help protect Finnish national
sovereignty. Churchill had championed this strategy because it was believed that cutting off
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access to Swedish iron ore would result in an inability of the Germans to manufacture the war
material they needed to achieve victory. Hitler understood what the Allies were planning and the
disastrous effect it would have on German means of production, which is why after the Winter
War he became ardent in his opinion that the Soviet Union must not bring more war into Finland.
Indeed, the desired course of action for Nazi Germany was for Scandinavia to be in a state of
peace, as this would rob the Allies of an excuse to invade Scandinavia and cut off the German
supply of Swedish iron ore.
The Winter War also resulted in a German reassessment of Soviet strength and
capabilities. As Chapter One showed, German military leaders, especially Hitler, were not at all
impressed with the Soviet Army during the Winter War. The Soviet Union had one of the largest
armies in the world in 1939, yet they could not quickly defeat the small nation of Finland in
combat. The lesson that Hitler learned from the Winter War was not that a large army will
struggle under poor leadership and hostile terrain; rather, Hitler learned that the Soviet Union
posed no threat to Germany or its desire to achieve Lebensraum in the east. The war in the East
had initially been viewed as a war that would have to wait, but the Winter War changed this
perception amongst German military leaders. Hitler drew from the Winter War the perception
that he did not have to wait to conquer France and England to take up arms against the Soviets;
instead he could do it whenever he felt it was necessary. Some Anglo-American historians have
furthered this argument, albeit it is usually only covered in detail in works that specialize on the
Winter War. As the first chapter showed, even the standard work on the lead up to the German
invasion of the Soviet Union, Gorodetsky’s Grand Delusion, does not even discuss Finland.
The importance of Finland is not only that it showed the Germans the weaknesses of the
Soviet Union or that the Allies wanted to turn Scandinavia into a war zone. One of the key
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reasons why Finland is more important to the story of World War II than Anglo-American
historians have been willing to grant is how the Winter War and its aftermath showed that
German and Soviet interests in Scandinavia were not compatible. As Krosby showed, the issue
of who would be in charge of the Petsamo nickel mines dominated the political relationship
between Germany, the Soviet Union, and Finland. This was an issue that the Nazis could not
back down from, as they desperately needed Finnish nickel to continue its war machine. Yet, the
Soviet Union felt that it needed to be in control of the nickel mines, regardless of what the
Germans thought. This would lead Hitler in August 1940 to make the decision that if the Soviets
pushed the issue in Petsamo, the Germans would occupy Petsamo and risk an early war with the
Soviets. As Chapter One showed, the Soviets were not interested in acquiring nickel, the Soviets
wanted to control the nickel output and incorporate Petsamo into the Soviet Union. This would
have allowed the Soviets to control the vital resource and have leverage in their dealings with
Hitler and Germany. This action, though, was a power grab by the Soviets that Hitler would not
allow, even if it meant war with the Soviets nearly a year earlier than the Nazis were planning.
This would climax in November 1940 when Hitler and Molotov met to discuss the future
relations between the Soviet Union and Germany. Hitler began screaming at Molotov that no
war should come to Finland, which Molotov had insinuated the Soviets wanted. The November
meeting between the two showed Hitler that war with the Soviets was going to come sooner or
later, and Finland was the main topic of discussion at that meeting. In December 1940, Directive
No. 21 was issued, which began the planning for Operation ‘Barbarossa,’ the November meeting
was a major part in leading to this decision.
In the second chapter the issue of how Sweden contributed to the Nazi war machine by
supplying Nazi Germany with the vital stocks of iron ore it needed to continue manufacturing its
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war materials was investigated. The Nazi economy was analyzed and it was established that
Hitler did not think that the invasion of Poland would result in a larger war with Great Britain
and France. When this occurred, though, it eliminated imports of French and Benelux iron ore
into the Reich. Germany, then, had to consolidate its remaining source of iron ore, Sweden. It
was not only that Sweden was the last country still contributing significant supplies of iron ore to
Germany, but rather it was the fact that Swedish iron ore was the highest quality of iron ore on
earth. Indeed, by 1939 Sweden accounted for half of the iron ore imported into Germany, which
combined with is high quality made it of the utmost importance for the Reich. As Chapter Two
argued, the year 1940 alone represents how important Swedish iron ore was to Germany because
in that year Germany lost 40 percent of its iron ore imports. Without Swedish iron ore coming
into Germany, the Reich would not have survived into 1941. This was why Churchill and the
Allies put so much effort into planning how to cut off the German supply of Swedish iron ore
during the Winter War and after, it truly would have crushed the German war economy. Indeed,
as Martin Fritz argued, the high quality of Swedish iron ore helped to ease the bottleneck on
German shipping because it was of such a high quality, less had to be shipped.
In Chapter Two it was also argued that Anglo-American historians have typically missed
the significance of Swedish action during the Holocaust. For instance, rarely have Englishspeaking historians discussed the rescue of the Danish Jews, which was undertaken by the
Swedes. Steven Koblik and Paul Levine deserve much credit for writing about these
undertakings and bringing them to light for Anglo-American audiences. The story of how the
Swedes rescued the Danish Jews is not so much important for the triumph it represented in
standing up to the Reich, as much as how it showed the importance of Swedish iron ore to the
Nazis. It was not as if the Nazis had no clue where the Danish Jews ended up, they fully
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understood that the Swedes had rescued them. The Nazis, though, understood that they could not
take action against Sweden for rescuing these Jews because of what it might mean towards the
iron ore trade. The example of Hungary was used in Chapter Two to compare how the fate of
these two nations and their refusal to cooperate with the Final Solution ended in two completely
different fates based upon what they could offer to the Reich. Sweden, because of its iron ore,
and location, was able to escape occupation or any real reprisals from the Nazis because of the
fact that an invasion would lead to the iron ore mines being destroyed before the Nazis could
occupy them. The Hungarians, though, only had oil and a vital buffer zone to offer the Nazis.
Oil fields could be easily repaired in comparison to iron ore mines and it mattered little if the
Hungarians or the Nazis were running the country in terms of it being a buffer zone. This
example is the best evidence for the importance of Swedish iron ore to the Nazi war machine,
they had to turn a blind eye towards the Swedish interruption of the Final Solution in order to
continue the war.
In Chapter Three the Nazi invasion of Norway was examined in order to determine how
accurate the Anglo-American interpretation of that event was. It was established in this chapter
that at the outbreak of war the Nazis wanted Norway to remain neutral, a feeling that the Nazis
held until the Altmark Incident proved Norwegian neutrality was not enforceable against the
British. While Anglo-American authors have continued to pass the blame for the invasion upon
the alleged instigating actions of Vidkun Quisling, Chapter Three showed that up until February
1940 there was no serious planning for any German action in Norway. Certianly, there were
operational plans drawn up and investigated, but those were strictly hypothetical. It was not until
the Germans were convinced that the Allies would not respect the neutrality of Norway that
these plans shifted from the hypothetical to reality. The catalyst for this was not Quisling’s visit,
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as Churchill and so many other Anglo-American historians have argued; rather, it was the British
boarding of the Altmark. This was not the sole event that spurred Hitler to immediate action, but
it was the event that created the desire for action. By not understating this event, AngloAmerican historians have continued to misconstrue the invasion of Norway.
It was also argued in Chapter Three that the Allies could have defeated the Germans in
Norway in April 1940 if they would only have seized the initiative. It was shown that the British
had completely obliterated the German naval forces in the harbor of Narvik on April 13, 1940,
leaving no German ships still afloat. Yet, the British did not take the initiative and land its troops
in Narvik to fight the few hundred Germans stationed there. German General Dietl, who was in
charge of the German troops stationed in Narvik, could not believe his eyes when the British
chose to head home instead of land and fight the Germans. Hitler himself was so sure that
Narvik was lost after the British wiped out the German ships stationed at Narvik that he ordered
General Dietl to evacuate Narvik and retreat to meet the other German forces stationed in
Trondheim. If not for Hitler’s staff interfering in delivering the order, the Germans would have
given up Narvik. Remarkably, though, this failure is rarely mentioned in the Anglo-American
histories of the Second World War. For historians this episode should be more widely
understood because it was a true chance to turn the tide of the war in April 1940. If the British
had taken Narvik, which had been their goal since September 19, 1939, then they could have
effectively cut the Germans off from the Swedish iron ore they believed the Germans to so
desperately need. Would this not have been worth fighting a battle over?
Chapter Three also analyzed another failure of the Allies in Norway during April 1940,
the decision to avoid a direct landing in Trondheim. The British had successfully landed troops
in Namsos and Åndalsnes, two Norwegian ports that surrounded the major Norwegian port of
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Trondheim. The British wanted to run the Germans out of Trondheim, so it was planned to use
the troops in Namsos and Åndalsnes to distract the Germans while the British landed troops into
Trondheim itself. The idea was for a direct assault upon the city. When the time came for the
landings, though, the British changed plans at the last minute in the hopes that a pincer
movement coordinated between the troops in Namsos and Åndalsnes could achieve victory
against the Germans. Even this attack, though, was reconsidered and the Allies decided to
withdraw all troops from central Norway in late-April. Once again, here was a chance for the
Allies to achieve victory against the Nazis squandered. The Final Allied mistake came in May
1940 after the Allies finally took the city of Narvik. The Allies quickly decided to evacuate from
this city, though, because of the German victories in France. The entire goal of having Allied
troops in Norway had finally been achieved, yet the Allies decided to forsake this victory. As
Chapter Three pointed out, though, the saddest part of all of this was that the Allies did not even
let the Norwegians know that the decision had been made to withdraw until well after the
decision had been made. The significance of Norway to the Second World War, as the Third
Chapter pointed out, was that because of Allied mistakes the Germans now had secured the
Swedish iron ore and Finnish nickel that they needed to continue the war. The Allies would
never again be in a position to break this supply until 1945, when the war was ending.
It is a shame that Anglo-American historians have not looked into this region more in the
study of the Second World War. A lot of the answers to questions of why certain things
happened in World War II come from events that transpired in Scandinavia. While there are
seldom definitive answers to any questions in regards to the Second World War, the overall
importance of Scandinavia must be better understood amongst Anglo-American historians.
Every work by historians who have investigated Scandinavia in further detail, H. Peter Krosby,
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John Gilmour, Martin Fritz, or Henrik Lunde for example, has yielded evidence of the
importance of this region that has seldom, if ever, been discussed amongst Anglo-American
historians. The events in Scandinavia that this thesis has investigated are open to interpretation.
What is not open for interpretation, though, is that these events deserve more than the few
paragraphs or few pages that are generally assigned to them by Anglo-American historians.
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